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2ABSTRACT
Unanimous Voice, Unanimous Symbol:
         George Washington during the Revolutionary War
by
Matthew Joseph Hitechew
George Washington’s role in the American Revolution has not been lost in the mists of 
time, but most modern Americans have lost touch with his actual character and style 
because of the immense cultural changes that have transpired since the eighteenth 
century.  However, by examining the duties of Washington throughout the Revolutionary 
War from four different perspectives a more holistic interpretation of Washington during 
America’s fight for independence may be gained.  This study examines the relationships 
Washington had with Congress as well as with his fellow officers and troops.  Particular 
attention is paid to the manner in which Washington led the army, in addition to how he 
was perceived by his contemporaries at large.  The goal of this thesis is to achieve a 
holistic interpretation of Washington’s tenure as Commander-in-Chief, which will enable 
a better understanding of why Washington was and continues to be perceived as a symbol 
for American independence. 
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6CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
George Washington and the American Revolution do not suffer from a lack of 
historical coverage; however, much of the writing concerning Washington is tainted with 
hero worship or hero denunciation.  This study is not concerned with judging the actions 
of Washington within a moral framework to determine right or wrong.  Such an 
assessment is impossible given the cultural distance between the modern world and 
Washington’s eighteenth century.  Rather, this study seeks to investigate the tenure of 
Washington as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army from four different 
perspectives.  Three of the perspectives take the form of narratives, while the final 
chapter is essentially a narrative but with an eye on the bigger picture throughout the 
study.  Most importantly, this study is concerned with the character and style of 
Washington as it pertained to executing his duties as the military leader of the American 
Revolution.
Although this study focuses on Washington during the Revolution, it is not a 
military history, at least not in the traditional sense.  The chapter concerning 
Washington’s military style is the furthest this study goes in exploring traditional military 
history; yet, a great amount of time was spent examining numerous military histories by 
authors such as W.J. Wood and Bruce Lancaster.  The inspiration for this study was born 
from the works of authors such as T.H. Breen, David H. Fischer, and David McCullough, 
and of course from the writings of Washington himself.  Breen’s study in colonial 
consumerism and the Revolution helped contribute to my personal study of dual-identity 
in colonial America.  However, to better grasp the concept of dual-identity I thought it 
7prudent to examine perhaps a man, or some other symbol, which brought colonial 
Americans together.  There are many writings on the differences that existed between the 
colonies before, during, and after the war, but I wanted to take the opportunity to 
understand what united them and, more importantly, what kept them motivated 
throughout the entirety of the Revolutionary War.
In terms of American history, one figure stands above all the rest: George 
Washington.  Washington’s status throughout the war and the vast literature concerning 
the conflict allow us to examine Washington’s multifaceted role in the Revolutionary 
War.  This study explores such questions as:  How did Washington lead the army?  How 
did he cooperate with his fellow officers and Congress? And how did his contemporaries 
view him throughout the war?  By critically examining these inquiries, a more holistic 
interpretation of Washington may be gained.  The study is organic in that it seeks to 
understand the various aspects of the systematic growth of Washington as a symbol for 
American Independence.
The second chapter focuses on the relationship between George Washington and 
the Continental Congress throughout the entirety of the Revolutionary War.  It is 
appropriate to begin the study with this relationship because it was Congress that created 
the Continental Army and the position of Commander-in-Chief, but it was Washington 
who actually developed rough militia units into a well-trained fighting force.  The 
relationship between Washington and Congress is important because it illuminates the 
distribution of power between the military and governmental bodies in America.  
Washington’s struggle to convince Congress that he needed a professional army reflected 
both the precarious situation in which he found himself and the army, as well as many 
8American’s traditional fears of a standing army.  Ultimately, Washington’s faithful 
adherence to Congressional authority helped make the American Revolution unique 
because leadership of the war never turned tyrannical or totalitarian.
The third chapter deals with the style and manner that Washington employed to 
conduct the war.  This chapter is concerned with identifying the major themes of 
Washington’s leadership, including his approach to battle.  One of the most interesting 
aspects of this chapter is that it deals with the internal struggles of Washington; between 
his desire to achieve a grand stroke of victory and the reality of fighting a defensive war 
with, at times, a skeleton force.  Washington was a man of action.  When his army was 
forced to remain intact, but inactive, he was forced to fight his natural, internal urge to 
act.  Perhaps Washington’s greatest attribute during the Revolutionary War was his 
ability and willingness to learn.  Although Washington’s military concepts and strategies 
changed dramatically during the course of the war, one element of his leadership 
remained constant throughout the entire conflict, discipline.  Considerable attention is 
also paid to the openness of Washington’s system, with particular emphasis on 
individuals such as Henry Knox.
The relationship between Washington and his officers is the subject of the fourth 
chapter.  When the revolutionary movement shifted from essentially non-violent 
resistance to a state of war the emphasis on the army became paramount.  The army was 
the heart and soul of the Revolution, something Washington understood all too well.  
Thus, it is important to understand how Washington communicated with his fellow 
officers.  This study explores the character of Washington from the viewpoint of different 
American officers but essentially focuses on how Washington perceived his fellow 
9officers.  Gen. Nathanael Greene stands out in this chapter because he eventually became 
Washington’s “right-hand man” and most trusted officer.  One important aspect of this 
study is that it recognizes the other side of Washington, a side that could be deemed 
“dark.”  Washington was certainly highly conscious of his public perception, but it 
appears that he was also at times extremely paranoid, which led him occasionally to be 
cold and vindictive.  Washington’s actions towards his fellow officers reflected not only 
the army’s particular situation but also help identify key aspects of his character.
  The final chapter is dedicated to examining how Washington was perceived by 
his contemporaries.  The second, third, and fourth chapters are told mainly from the 
perspective of Washington, but this chapter deals exclusively with how others felt about 
him.  Because Washington was so well known during his lifetime, and almost anyone 
who received a letter from him kept it, the sources for this chapter span a large spectrum.  
The colonial newspapers provided a great opportunity for individuals to celebrate or 
berate the character of Washington, but so did the theatre and tavern drinking hall, where 
many sang songs of praise for one of the two Georges.  Religion played an immense role 
in motivating individuals to join the fight for American independence, and Washington 
was often referred to as the “American Moses.”  By exploring what Washington meant to 
various groups of people, including Loyalists, it is possible to understand how he became 
a symbol for America at large.  
In his most recent work, Gordon Wood wrote: “George Washington may still be 
first in war and first in peace, but he no longer seems to be first in the hearts of his 
countrymen.”1  Little wonder that many modern American’s have lost touch with 
                                                
1 Gordon Wood, Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different, (The Penguin 
Press, New York), 31.
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Washington because not only has his world long since passed, but his symbol has been 
over-commercialized and extremely simplified.  Such treatment of Washington does not 
do justice to the efforts of Washington and the entire Revolutionary Generation.  Viewed 
in the proper context, the story of how Washington led the army provides an accurate 
glimpse into the creation of the American republic and an understanding of how 
Washington came to be viewed as a symbol for America:  Not simply as a “great man” 
who never erred, but as a man who represented a common bond between many different 
individuals.  J.T Headley wrote: “Though seemingly a contradiction, it is nevertheless 
true, that time only renders the character of Washington more clear, while the 
circumstances which developed it become more and more indistinct.”2  Though 
Headley’s quote does contain some elements of truth, by examining the various 
relationships Washington had during the war, as well as understanding how he was 
perceived by various groups, it is possible to grasp the world in which Washington lived, 
operated, and made decisions, and ultimately why he became such an important symbol 
for the American Republic.
                                                
2 J.T. Headley, Washington and His Generals, (reprint: Privately Published by Westvaco 
Corporation, Christmas 1991), 41. 
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CHAPTER 2
WASHINGTON AND CONGRESS
The relationship between George Washington, as Commander-in-Chief of the 
Continental Army, and the Continental Congress demonstrated many of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the united colonies.  Washington’s and Congress’s relationship was 
complex to say the least.  Indeed, the relationship was born out of necessity with no clear 
indication of what the future might bring.  The tone of Washington and others at the 
beginning of hostilities indicated that many thought the conflict would shortly be 
resolved.  Before Washington left to join the army in Boston he wrote to his wife that 
with help from providence “I shall return safe to you in the fall.”3  However, the conflict 
in Boston would soon spread throughout the colonies and into parts of Canada and cover 
eight years of time.  Therefore, the relationship between Washington and Congress grew 
over time, adapting to specific situations while clinging to certain core ideas such as 
state’s rights.  By examining the relationship throughout various stages of the war, a 
better understanding of the importance of both Washington’s and Congress’s duties 
during the Revolutionary War may be gained.
When the Second Continental Congress convened in May 1775, the atmosphere 
was different than it had been at the first gathering in September 1774.  The events at 
Lexington and Concord propelled the revolutionary movement into the arena of armed 
conflict with British Regulars, something the First Continental Congress did not plan.  
Many issues and matters were discussed within Congress, but one of the most important 
concerned the creation of a Continental Army and the appointment of a general to lead it.  
                                                
3 John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington From the Original Manuscript 
Sources: 1745-1799, Vol. III, Jan. 1770-Sept. 1775, (United States Government Printing Office, 
Washington, 1931) 294.
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Perhaps no other individual in America was more suited for the job of commander-in-
chief than Washington.  
Because of regional disputes within Congress, most New England delegates knew 
that a compromise with the Southern colonies was necessary if overall unity was to be 
achieved.  Washington was from Virginia, a colony with many appealing qualities 
including the largest population of all the colonies, a radical nature, and a healthy 
economy.  However, Washington’s selection did not stem simply from his place of 
origin.  He was a successful planter and gentleman, stood well over six feet tall, and had 
military experience from the French and Indian War as well as experience in legislative 
duties.  In addition, Washington came to Congress every day dressed in a striking 
uniform of red and blue that he had personally designed for his use as leader of the 
Fairfax Independent company, a militia unit in Virginia.4  In a letter to his wife John 
Adams stated that the choice of Washington would “have a great effect in cementing and 
securing the union of these colonies.”5
On June 15th Washington was unanimously elected general and commander-in-
chief of the Continental Army.  The next day Washington gave what would become a 
famous address to Congress.  Washington not only accepted the appointment, but did so 
without pay, asking only to be compensated for what he spent out of his own purse.  The 
following day, June 17, Washington received his formal commission from Congress, 
which stated in rather vague terms that Washington had the authority to “act as you shall 
think for the good and welfare of the service.”  Congress’s definition of the Continental 
                                                
4 Bruce Chadwick, George Washington’s War: The Forging of a Revolutionary Leader and the 
American Presidency, (Sourcebooks, Inc., Naperville, Illinois, 2004), 66, 68-69.
5 Edmund C. Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, Vol. I: August 29, 1774 
to July 4, 1776, (Carnegie Institute of Washington, Washington D.C., re. 1963), 130.
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Army was equally wide-ranging, which clearly reflected the infancy of the army.  
Essentially, Congress granted Washington the authority to be in charge of everyone who 
was taking up arms against “every hostile invasion thereof.”  The commission also 
ordered Washington to provide soldiers with stringent discipline and the proper 
necessities of life to the best of his abilities.6  
Washington arrived in Boston on July 3 and formally took command of the 
collection of New England troops.  Historian Fred Anderson noted that because 
Washington received command of the thirteen colonies through the authority of the 
Continental Congress, the transformation of New England regiments into a Continental 
Army was “the physical embodiment of a political union.”7  However, the transformation 
of the provincial troops into a Continental Army was not complete the instant 
Washington appeared in camp.  On paper and in the minds of Congress the “Continental 
Army” existed, but the reality of being in charge of synthesizing the hodgepodge 
collection of troops in Massachusetts must have overwhelmed Washington at first sight.  
Washington formally referred to the army as the United Provinces of North 
America and called upon everyone to lay aside regional differences and come together as 
one solid force.  In order to better understand the size of the force he now commanded, 
Washington ordered an official census of the army, including supplies.  He also set into 
motion a plan to create and maintain discipline.  Strict rules were enforced that forbade 
swearing and enforced subordination.  Cleanliness was required as well.  Soldiers were 
                                                
6 Worthington C. Ford,ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1783, Vol. 2, May 10 to 
September 20, 1775 (Washington D.C., 1903-1937), June 17, 1775.  Found at www.loc.gov.
7 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North 
America, 1754-1766, (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2000), xxi.
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no longer allowed to visit Mill Pond for fear of introducing smallpox to the army.8  It was 
these regulations that lead Pastor Emerson to remark, “The strictest government is taking 
place.”9  The transformation took time; the cultural differences between Virginia and 
New England were vast.  However, Washington’s countenance and dignified manner
seemed to impress his soldiers and instilled into the army a tone of legitimacy.10
The returns from his official census of the army and its supplies were extremely 
discouraging.  In a letter to the President of the Continental Congress Washington 
expressed the opinion of himself and other generals by stating the need to recruit soldiers 
from areas outside of New England, specifically Massachusetts.  Supplies such as tents, 
clothing, and ammunition were sparse, and Washington wrote “I find myself already 
much embarrassed for want of a military chest.” Washington also noted the absence of 
engineers, which were considered essential in Washington’s situation; commanding a 
siege.  He also made several recommendations for new offices including a Quarter 
Master General, Commissary of Musters, and Commissary of Artillery.  Appointments 
were also a bone of contention for some, like General Joseph Spencer, who left the army 
after refusing to serve under General Israel Putnam.11  Many of the problems that 
Washington encountered early in the war would continue to plague him and the army 
until the end of hostilities.  
Washington’s letter and its request were received differently by different 
members of Congress.  Benjamin Harris felt sympathy for the general and assured him 
that Congress was doing everything in its power to alleviate his problems.  Harrison 
                                                
8 Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, Vol. 3, 309-310.
9 David McCullough, 1776, (Simon and Schulster, New York and London, 2005), 32.
10 McCullough, 1776, 43-44.
11 Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, Vol. 3, 309-310.
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noted quite joyfully that Congress not only approved his recommendations for new 
offices but left the general in charge of selecting men to fill those new roles.  On the other 
end of the spectrum, John Adams wrote to James Warren of the new developments.  
Adams was annoyed that Congress had to comply with the list of provincial generals that 
had been appointed in the First Continental Congress.  He was equally, if not more, 
annoyed that the decision to choose the appointments of the newly created offices was 
left to Washington.  Adams wrote, “The Consequence has been that the appointment of 
these important and lucrative officers is left to the General, against every proper Rule and 
Principle, as these offices are Checks upon his.”  The following day, July 24, Adams 
wrote Warren again but this letter as Adams explained was written “freely.” Adams 
stated that Congress should have already established control over the whole legislative 
body of the continent because without it they were caught between “hawk and 
buzzard.”12  
Adams acknowledged a fundamental lack of overall authority by the Continental 
Congress.  The comparison between Adams and Harrison’s responses also brings to light 
the different perceptions within Congress.  However, the root of Congress’s problems 
stemmed from its lack of authority.  Congress’s lack of institutional authority was a side-
effect of an assembly that was essentially a “meeting of committees.”  Adams correctly 
identified a problem with the Second Continental Congress when he wrote concerning 
that group’s adoption of the same policy as the First Continental Congress.  The 
circumstances in which each Congress met were simply too different for the same system 
to be effective.  Many Congressional representatives put the priority of their state above 
                                                
12 Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, Vol. I, 169-170, 173-174, 176.
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all else.  This type of attitude and approach to business put a strain on efficiency.13  The 
creation of the Continental Army and George Washington’s Commission changed the 
direction of the Continental Congress.  Congress was no longer overseeing a boycott or 
simply organizing public support, it was now in charge of supplying an army, a task that 
required coordination.
The first winter encampment of the newly created army would not be the worst, 
but the problems posed during this time would form precedents.  Washington addressed 
the Congress in a letter dated September 21, 1775, in which he spoke of many impending 
disasters that were to come with the winter.  Problems arose with payment for soldiers 
and officers, including an argument over pay by lunar or calendar month.  Two of 
Washington’s most vexing problems concerned keeping the army together and keeping 
the army clothed and warm for the winter.  Many enlistments were due to expire in the 
coming weeks, and Washington was again left with an empty military chest.  
Washington’s Commissary General and Quarter Master General had pushed their credit 
to the end, and now Washington was in desperate need of clothing and blankets.  The 
situation led him to say “they [soldiers] may be deemed in a state of nakedness.”  
Washington also informed Congress that he had sent Colonel Benedict Arnold to “if 
possible make himself Master of Quebec.”14
The invasion of Canada was the brain child of Congress.  Many of the delegates 
reasoned that French Canadians would join the thirteen colonies in rebellion and create a 
united North American front.  On November 8, 1775 Congress wrote to General 
                                                
13 Rick Wilson and Calvin Jillson, “Leadership Patterns in the Continental Congress, 1774-1789,” 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Feb., 1989), 8, 11.
14 Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, Vol. 3, 505-512.
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Schuyler, “Exert your utmost endeavors to induce the Canadians to accede to a union 
with these colonies, and that they form from their several parishes, a provincial 
Convention, and send Delegates to this Congress.”  Congress also guaranteed religious 
freedom.15  Congress had previously attempted to gain the support of Canada through 
bureaucratic endeavors but had failed to receive a positive reply.  Arnold and Ethan Allen 
captured Fort Ticonderoga in early May 1775 but were forced to abandon it later.  Based 
on testimony from Allen and Arnold, Congress deemed Canada an easy target.  However, 
the Canadian invasion was a disaster, culminating in the American defeat at Quebec on 
December 31, 1775.  Arnold and three other generals kept the siege alive outside Quebec, 
but it was never a serious threat.  When General Burgoyne arrived in Quebec and 
rendezvoused with General Carleton’s existing forces the invasion of Canada ended, 
lasting just two months shy of an entire year.16
As fall gave way to winter the fortunes of the army seemed to be in doubt.  The 
effort to re-enlist soldiers for another campaign had produced some results but not 
enough to make Washington happy, much less comfortable.  Privately the Virginia 
gentleman commander loathed the Yankee soldier.  The absence of good news from 
Congress coupled with the politics of a stalemate left Washington in a foul mood.  
However, on November 28, 1775 Captain John Manley, a privateer of the schooner Lee, 
captured the Nancy, a brig, just north of Boston.  Washington expressed the event in 
terms of providence, but actually he had sent out a number of private schooners to 
accomplish precisely what the Lee had done.  Historian David McCullough wrote, “The 
                                                
15 Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, Vol. 3, Nov. 8, 1775.
16 W.J. Wood, Battles of the Revolutionary War, 1775-1781 (Da Capo Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 2003) 
35-37, 54.
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ship was loaded with military treasure- a supply of war material such as Congress could 
not be expected to provide for months to come…nearly everything needed but powder.”17  
The situation with the Lee is important because it demonstrated the type of action that 
was so desperately needed by Washington, and the type of action that Congress had to 
offer.
Thanks in large part to Washington’s willingness to approve young Henry Knox’s 
plan to acquire artillery from Fort Ticonderoga and transport it back to Dorchester 
Heights, the Continental Army was able to force the British out of Boston.  The British 
departed in March and before long the Continental Army would as well.  In April 1776 
Washington arrived in New York, ready to begin preparations for a showdown in the near 
future.18  Again, Washington was in need of supplies for his men and wrote to Congress 
expressing his need, but he also wrote to Colonel Joseph Reed.  Reed informed 
Washington that he had secured the supplies but he also mentioned that Congress was 
divided by factions.  Washington wrote back on April 23, most disturbed by the news 
concerning Congress, and urged Reed to hire horses in order to deliver the supplies 
quickly.  The same day Washington also wrote to Congress informing them of Reed’s 
cache of supplies and requested that it pay for the supplies.19  Washington never failed to 
inform Congress of the army’s needs, but he also learned that other avenues had to be 
pursued.  Reed’s information concerning the state of Congress did not help instill 
confidence in an assembly that had already proved incapable at times.
                                                
17 McCullough, 1776, 63-64. 
18 McCullough, 1776, 82,117.
19 Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, Vol. 4, 505-508.
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The division that Reed referred to in his letter to Washington stemmed from the 
overall differences that existed between the colonies and the geographic region in which 
each colony was situated.  The split may be categorized into two factions, conservative 
and radical.  Historian H.J. Henderson noted that the radical and conservative split did 
not concern commitment to war but rather perception of the war.  Radicals tended to view 
the war in ideological terms, which meant total reform through total commitment on 
behalf of the citizens.  New England Congressmen represented the radical element in 
Congress, but they also received some support from the Southern and Middle Colonies.  
The conservative faction in Congress feared internal divisions in areas such as the Middle 
Colonies and tended to back away from making the war a “people’s revolution.”  
Conservatives such as Robert Morris saw the creation of the military as a necessary step 
in order to regain control of a situation that was turbulent.20
One question that Washington continually posed to the Continental Congress 
early in the war regarded an official Indian policy.  He wrote to Major General Philip 
Schuyler on April 19, 1776, “I have urged to Congress the necessity of engaging them 
[Indians] on our side, to prevent their taking an active part against us, which would be a 
most fatal stroke under our present circumstances.”21  The President of Congress, John 
Hancock, wrote Washington on June 11 notifying him Congress had not come to a
decision concerning Indian relations.  Hancock told Washington that Congress would 
probably be in agreement with him on the issue and promised to work harder in the future 
to secure such business in a faster manner.22  Finally, on June 20 Washington was able to 
                                                
20 H. James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress (McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 
1974), 102-105.
21   Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, Vol. 4, 496.
22  Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, Vol. 1, 481-482.
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send orders to General Schuyler informing him of Congress’s resolves concerning the 
Indians.  The Indian question was so vital to Washington because he needed to secure a 
passage into Canada.23  The need for a passage way into Canada stemmed from the 
continued siege of Quebec, which was in its last stages.
In June 1776 Congress attempted to solve problems concerning the maintenance 
and management of the war.  Acting upon the suggestions of a Congressional committee 
it created a Board of War made up of five members.  John Adams, Roger Sherman, 
Benjamin Harrison, James Wilson, and Edward Rutledge were elected to the Board of 
War with Richard Peters serving as secretary and Adams as President.  John Hancock 
thought the creation of the board to be a pivotal moment in the direction of war.  Hancock 
assumed the board would create a working system for supplying the military.  The duties 
of the Board of War were vast.  The board was in charge of keeping an exact count of 
officers, soldiers, arms, artillery, and other military supplies as well as guarding money 
being sent from Congress, fitting and dispatching land forces, taking care of prisoners of 
war, and maintaining the letters and papers of the board.  Because members of the Board 
of War were required to attend Congress regularly, their schedule was dictated by the 
course of Congress.  Many members such as John Adams became overburdened.  
Despite Hancock’s optimism the Board of War was not capable of streamlining 
the management of the war.  The board’s duties were too extensive and it generally 
lacked the authority to solve problems.  Congress granted the Board of War enough 
power to solve very specific problems, but overall the board was reduced to simply 
making suggestions to Congress.  One of the tasks that consumed a great deal of the 
Board of War’s time was determining commissions of foreign officers.  The question of 
                                                
23  Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, Vol. 5, 162.
21
rank became a thorn in the Board’s side.  Because many individuals simply did not have 
documented resumes, Congress decided the Board of War should review each request 
and make a decision based on evidence.  This was a time-consuming task that caused the 
work of the Board of War to slow down considerably.  Many individuals, such as Samuel 
Chase, recognized the need to reorganize the Board of War as early as December, 1776.24   
Before the British invaded New York in August, important developments 
occurred in Congress and throughout the colonies. The question of independence became 
of paramount importance.  Until this time the question had only been posed by radical 
factions and then only sporadically.  Perhaps independence was the next logical step, but 
it was a step Congress took very cautiously.  On July 6, Hancock wrote to Washington 
informing him that Congress had decided upon independence from Great Britain.  He 
enclosed a copy of the Declaration of Independence and asked Washington to “have it 
proclaimed at the Head of the Army in the way you shall think most proper.”25  The 
Declaration of Independence changed the dynamics of Washington’s job as Commander-
in-Chief of the army.  He was no longer leading a fight for restoration and preservation
but a fight for complete independence.
  Historian David Hackett Fischer noted that the Continental Congress and its 
generals had several different options on how to conduct and win the war.  Essentially all 
of the plans that were incorporated involved a strategy of avoiding open conflict with the 
British.  However, Washington and Congress were certain that the British would choose 
New York City when they returned, and both decided the city had to be defended.  
General Charles Lee was chosen by Congress and Washington to organize the defense of 
                                                
24 Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of Executive Departments of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789
(Peter Smith, Gloucester, Mass., 1971), 8-11.
25 Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, Vol. 2, 2.
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the city.  After assessing the army’s situation, General Lee concluded the city was at the 
mercy of whoever controlled the water surrounding it.  Lee’s plan for defense of New 
York was accepted but was altered significantly by Washington.  The fall of New York 
would prove to be one of the most troubling and desperate times for Washington and the 
Revolution.  The Continental Army sustained heavy losses and was forced to retreat 
through the New Jersey countryside.  Fischer wrote that the disaster of New York “was 
the lowest point of Washington’s long career.”26  
In the days leading up to Christmas 1776, Washington wrote to Robert Morris, 
Congress, and others describing his awful position.  The army was about to be disbanded 
come New Year because of the terms of enlistment ending.  His army needed supplies 
and the wounded needed care, plus General Lee had been captured.  On Christmas he 
wrote to Morris again, thanking him for sending a shipment of blankets.  Washington’s 
tone in this letter was different, he suggested that the colonies should “look forward with 
hopes that some lucky chance may yet turn up in our favor.”  Washington ended the note 
looking toward the future, yet firmly planted in reality: “I hope the next Christmas will 
prove happier than the present to you and to Dear Sir.”27  The duty of Commander-in-
Chief was its heaviest during this period for Washington.  He found himself confronted 
with the problem of losing his army as well as the popular support needed to keep the war 
effort alive.  On Christmas night Washington led his army across the Delaware and 
successfully attacked the town of Trenton, followed up by another victory at Princeton.
The fall of New York had brought an important question to a head between 
Congress and the military.  The various problems of managing the war that had existed 
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prior to the last days of 1776 were only magnified by the outcome of the New York 
Campaign.  General Nathanael Greene wrote to Congress in late 1776 asking it to 
consider some other method of conducting the war.  Essentially, Greene was asking 
permission for the army to solely conduct military affairs.  The army did not want 
Congress making tactical decisions, such as the invasion of Quebec in 1775.  Congress 
responded on the same day that Washington attacked Trenton, December, 26, with a 
resolve granting Washington full authority to conduct the war.28  Congress’s resolve to 
grant full authority to Washington certainly demonstrated a great deal of trust between 
the two parties, but Washington’s leadership would later be called into question.
After the Battle of Princeton, the army moved into winter encampment at 
Morristown, New Jersey.  The winter of 1777 would almost strip Washington of his 
army.  The army was in great need of clothing and was very poorly fed, plus the 
harshness of the winter caused many soldiers to fall ill.  Smallpox was introduced into the 
camp as well, causing Washington to take drastic measures.  On February 13, 1777, the 
Medical Committee wrote to inform Washington that in order to save the army all 
soldiers who had not been inoculated for smallpox were to receive the treatment.29  
However, Washington had already acted on his own authority.  When he arrived in camp 
on January 6, he ordered Chief Army Doctor William Shippen to begin inoculations.  
Bruce Chadwick noted that Washington’s decision to inoculate the army was the first use 
of “executive order.”  The decision to inoculate the entire army was groundbreaking 
because no other army had done so before for any disease.  Congress backed 
Washington’s decision to act quickly because it was within his given powers as 
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Commander-in-Chief and it was for the overall good of the army. 30  Inoculating the army 
would prove to be a resourceful move.  The army was salvaged, and the revolution 
continued.
Despite the success of inoculating the army at Morristown, the medical 
administration of the Continental Army had problems.  The problems began when 
Washington first took over the army in 1775 and ordered a reorganization of the hospital.  
Washington’s actions angered regimental surgeons who were no longer allowed to 
simply take medical supplies, plus Washington demanded weekly reports.  Benjamin 
Church was appointed the first Director General of the Hospital shortly thereafter.  The 
clash with regimental surgeons continued, but before Church could work out a 
compromise he was arrested for treason.  The problems between the general and 
regimental hospitals continued throughout the war with no stable leadership until late in 
the war.  In 1780 John Cochran was selected Director General, and served the army well 
until the end of hostilities.31
During the winter-encampment at Morristown Washington spent a great deal of 
his time pleading to Congress for more troops.  From December to March, Washington 
wrote Congress expressing his deep concern.  At the beginning of hostilities in 1775 
Congress stated that it could raise a force of more than seventy-five thousand men.  At 
Morristown, Washington could only count about three thousand soldiers, and many of 
those were too sick to stand, much less fight.  Washington wanted a new army that 
consisted of men who signed on for long enlistments because his experience in the field 
suggested that an army of citizen/soldiers was not capable of winning the war.  Although 
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Washington was vocal about his dislike of the militia, he was forced to beg for their 
assistance during the winter of 1777, an act that clearly defined the precarious situation 
that Washington found himself and the army in.  One of the biggest points of contention 
Washington had with his supply of troops was the ability of a state legislature to recall 
troops from his army. 32
Historian Paul Nelson noted that most American officers preferred a regular army.  
In addition to Washington’s complaints, during the Southern Campaign in 1780-81, 
Generals Nathanael Greene and Daniel Morgan both lamented the use of militia troops.  
Although Greene and Morgan were victorious with the use of militia, their success 
depended largely on a contingent of Continental troops.  Nelson also noted officers who 
were more ideological, such as Charles Lee, preferred the use of militia.  The main debate
concerning the militia and regular army centered largely upon finding the correct mixture 
of the two types of armies.  The question concerning the citizen/soldier or regular army 
would not be solved during or after the Revolutionary War.33  Despite these differences,
when Washington left Morristown in May his army had grown to about nine thousand 
troops.  Rebuilding the army had taken the efforts of Washington, state leaders, and 
Congress.  Many of the men who signed on to fight became Continental Regulars and 
agreed to terms lasting from one to three years.  Washington did not have the army he 
wanted, but it was certainly a step in the right direction.  He was still dependent to some 
degree on militiamen, but the importance of long enlistments was finally understood by 
Congress.
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Despite the refurbished Continental Army, the British were able to take control of 
Philadelphia, the capital of the United Colonies and the meeting place for Congress, after 
the Battle of Brandywine.  Washington mounted an offensive at Germantown in the 
following weeks but was unable to restore the capital to American control.  Not long after 
Washington’s defeat at Germantown, General Gates achieved a stunning victory over 
British General Burgoyne at Saratoga, New York.  These events, coupled with an anti-
Washington group in Congress, created problems for Washington and the leadership of 
the war.  The anti-Washington group in Congress was led by members such as Richard 
Henry Lee and Thomas Mifflin.  In late November of 1777 Lee and others pushed for a 
reorganization of the Board of War.  The Board of War was steeped in problems, which 
the anti-Washington group used in their favor to appoint additional members to the Board 
of War who were sympathetic to their viewpoint.34
The revamped Board of War was to consist of three non-Congressional members, 
General Thomas Mifflin, Colonel Thomas Pickering, and Colonel Robert Harrison, but 
Harrison declined the invitation.  In place of Harrison, three additional members were 
chosen, General Gates, Joseph Trumbull, and Richard Peters.  Gates was named president 
of the Board of War and, along with Mifflin, represented an anti-Washington stance.  
Trumbull was not physically able to take his post because of an illness, and Pickering 
tended to view Washington in a “luke-warm” fashion.  Thus, Richard Peters was the only 
member of the Board of War who was strongly in favor of Washington’s leadership.  A 
separate problem developed in the form of Thomas Conway.  Conway was a French 
volunteer who found favor in Congress and was promoted to brigadier general.  Rank 
continually posed a bone of contention among many officers and created another problem 
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that Washington had to contemplate.  Washington accepted Conway’s initial promotion
but protested heavily when he heard Congress was considering making Conway a major 
general.  
The controversies concerning the Board of War and Thomas Conway merged 
after a letter written from Conway to Gates was discovered.  In the letter Conway berated 
Washington’s leadership and exonerated Gates.  If the letter had never been brought to 
attention, perhaps the so called Conway Cabal would never have occurred, but 
Washington found out the contents of the letter and quickly wrote Conway a short letter 
stating: “In a letter from Gen. Conway to Gen. Gates he says: ‘Heaven has been 
determined to save your country; or a weak general and bad counselors would have 
ruined it.’”35  Washington had good reason to be suspicious because Conway was also 
named Inspector General of the Board of War.  Gates was in charge of the committee that 
was to supply and maintain the army, and he received popular support among his 
colleagues.  Historian Jennings Sanders noted that “Gates’ ability to cause trouble 
increased by his new position.”36  
In January of 1778 Congress passed a resolution authorizing the Board of War to 
undertake another invasion of Canada.  The resolution did not mention Washington.  
Major General the Marquis de Lafayette along with Conway and General John Stark 
were elected by Congress to lead the assault.  Lafayette was one of Washington’s 
strongest advocates, which led him to despise Conway.  When Lafayette met with Gates 
and others at a banquet before the planned assault on Canada, he was incensed at the 
disrespect shown to Washington.  When Lafayette arrived in Albany to begin the journey 
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into Canada, he was shocked by what he found.  Lafayette wrote to Washington 
expressing his feelings concerning the Board of War and the deplorable state of affairs 
present in Albany.  Lafayette, with the help of Washington and Henry Laurens, was able 
to convince Congress to abandon the Canadian enterprise.  Conway was reassigned but 
disapproved of his new assignment under the command of General McDougall and 
eventually resigned.  Conway continued to have problems until he was seriously 
wounded in a duel with American General John Cadwalader on July 4, 1778.  Before 
returning to France Conway wrote Washington a letter in which he apologized for any 
wrong doings.37  
Perhaps Washington blew the situation with Conway and Gates out of proportion, 
but his view of the situation stemmed from his overall fear that certain congressmen and 
officers were eager to replace him.  Historian John Ferling noted that some individuals 
were not pleased with Washington’s leadership, but on the whole everyone understood 
the circumstances and were grateful to have Washington lead the army.  Furthermore, 
those who opposed Washington often did so over specific issues, and never considered 
electing a new commander-in-chief.38  At the same time Washington was dealing with 
challenges to his position of leadership, he was also dealing with serious problems 
developing from the army’s winter-encampment at Valley Forge.  Many of the problems 
Washington faced were the same that he had encountered at previous winter-
encampments, but Valley Forge presented problems that were distinctly unique.  
On February 17, 1778, John Laurens wrote to Henry Laurens from Valley Forge: 
“Those who are employed to feed us, either for want of knowledge or for want of activity 
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or both, never furnish supplies adequate to our wants.”  On March 24 Washington wrote 
to Congress expressing the same concerns but added “since the month of August last, 
between two and three hundred officers have resigned their commissions, and many 
others were with difficulty dissuaded from it.”  Four days later Washington wrote to 
Congress again to inform them that he had named Baron Von Stueben Inspector General 
of the Army.39  The appointment of Von Stueben was geared towards creating a 
disciplined army that operated from a single unified plan of engagement.  However, 
Washington needed to first ensure that he had an army to discipline.  Washington 
understood the situation of his soldiers and officers and knew that many of those who 
deserted did so because their families desperately needed them at home.  Washington 
recognized the need for Congress to enact a pension system.40
The pension method that Washington and others preferred was that of a half-pay 
system, which was prevalent throughout European armies.  The question split Congress 
nearly in half, with only a slim majority favoring the half-pay pension system for officers 
or their widows.  Those who opposed the measure were steadfast because they felt as 
though Congress did not have the authority to enact such a measure, and they feared the 
thought that a standing army might be produced from such a measure.  Thomas Burke, a 
Congressman from North Carolina, acknowledged that the former was by far the most 
prevalent reason to oppose the half-pay system.  Throughout the debates Washington 
stood steadfastly in support of the system.  The question was then posed to the states 
which produced essentially the same results as the Congressional voting.  The debate was 
finally settled via a compromise in which officers would receive half-pay, not for life, but 
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for seven years after the end of the conflict.41  In the end, those in Congress who were 
against half-pay did agree to step beyond their presumed authority but only in a measured 
way.  
The winter-encampment at Valley Forge was a trying time for everyone, 
especially the troops.  A variety of problems confronted Congress.  One of the main 
reasons that Congress was unable to supply the troops in a satisfactory manner resulted 
from their own exile.  The British occupation of Philadelphia forced Congress to move to 
York.  York was a small town located in the interior of Pennsylvania that presented travel 
problems for many members of Congress.42 The tensions created between Washington 
and the Board of War also hindered progress.  Gates, Pickering, and Mifflin were 
scheduled to meet with Washington at Valley Forge to determine a plan for supplying the 
army.  Because of the tensions Gates and Mifflin never arrived, and what could have 
been a useful meeting never took place.  Gates was relieved from his duty on the Board 
of War in April 1778.  Afterwards, the Board of War became a virtual non-factor, often 
reduced to minor tasks such as providing a table for Washington.  Congress ignored the 
Board of War by assigning military tasks to other committees.  Despite performing minor 
tasks, the Board of War did not ease the problems that plagued the relationship between 
Washington and Congress.43
Leadership posed a problem that hindered the relationship between Washington
and Congress.  Washington had the authority to speak on behalf on the entire Continental 
Army, but Congress lacked a unified response.  Rick Wilson and Calvin Jillson argued 
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that if effective leadership was to come from Congress it would have been through the 
President of Congress, the committee system, or activity on the debate floor.  Wilson and 
Jillson’s study concluded that none of the above mentioned means produced effective 
leadership.  The President of Congress was reduced to a monitor during debate.  In 
November 1777, President Henry Laurens wrote to Washington “tis seldom in the power 
of the President to answer with that dispatch which may seem necessary.”  Laurens felt 
the same level of ineffectiveness as his predecessors, Peyton Randolph and John
Hancock, often referring to himself as a “silent spectator.”   Like Randolph and Hancock, 
Laurens resigned the office to regain his political voice.44  Washington wrote some of his 
most distressing letters to the various Presidents of Congress, but instead of having the 
authority to take serious action, the Presidents were forced to simply turn the matter over 
to debate and perhaps assign a committee.
The committee system was too constrained and was never allowed the 
opportunity to provide effective leadership and offer Washington a system that could ease 
the burdens of the army.  Most committees were formed in response to a specific letter or 
issue, which led to a large number of committees.  Wilson and Jillson identified 2,327 
committees between the years 1775 and 1783.  Distribution of members throughout the 
various committees was uneven and resulted in abundant workloads for members.  James 
Duane’s complaints in 1779 about the burden of committee appointments sound 
remarkably similar to John Adams’ complaint concerning his duties as President of the 
Board of War in 1776.  The activity on the floor determined the relevance of specific 
committees, but the floor also failed to produce a unified response and provide effective 
leadership.  If Washington was the unanimous voice of his countrymen, then 
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Congressional floor debate was the antithesis.  Thomas Rodney, a Congressman from 
Delaware, reported in March 1781 that “selfish conceit and opinions…[which led] them 
[Congressmen] to disagree in everything…this disjointed manner of proceeding throws 
government into that disordered tract of adopting one expedient after another 
perpetually.”  Instead of providing stability to counter the ineffectiveness of the 
committee system and the office of President, the floor produced no stable leadership.45  
Turnover and attendance were serious problems that plagued Congress throughout 
the entirety of the war.  During the Continental Army’s stay at Valley Forge Congress 
experienced a high rate of turnover, which meant that an increased workload was left to 
fall upon an inexperienced Congress.  The high rate of turnover also prevented long-term 
cooperation and coordination among members and their various political connections.  
Attendance was also a problem.  Although the British occupation of Philadelphia posed 
problems for many members, the length of Congressional service also posed effective 
leadership problems.  On average, most delegates to Congress served about six months 
out of the year.  Many members were constrained by rules under the Articles of 
Confederation, which stated that delegates could not serve more than three years out of 
any six year period.  Turnover combined with a faulty attendance policy prohibited 
Congress from acting in the most efficient manner, which in turn caused great problems 
for Washington and the army.46
The financial backing of the war caused problems for both Washington and 
Congress.  Throughout the war Congress routinely printed paper bills. By the end of 1775 
Congress had issued six million dollars in bills, which was only a minuscule amount of 
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the total dollars in bills issued by the end of 1779.47  Because of the large amount of 
paper bills put into circulation, prices increased heavily and the value of paper money 
decreased.  As a result, farmers and other providers of goods were reluctant to sell their 
goods for paper money.  Merchants were often blamed by the public for speculating in 
conjunction with public officials.  Some Congressmen did speculate, such as Sam Adams 
and then Quartermaster General Nathanael Greene, who urged Commissary General 
Jeremiah Wadsworth to keep their dealing secret because “for however just and upright 
our conduct may be, the world will have suspicions to our disadvantage.”48
Contributions made by the French during the war helped to ease the troubles that 
existed between Washington and Congress.  The government of France officially forged 
an alliance with Congress in February 1778, but France had been sending supplies on a 
limited basis beforehand.  The French company of Hortalez was created in May 1776 
with the sole purpose of distributing supplies to the American war effort.  It has been 
estimated that in the two years of its existence Hortalez supplied the Continental Army 
with eighty percent of its gunpowder.49 After February 1778 the French government sent 
large amounts of money, supplies, men, and a navy to aid the American war effort.  
French support helped Washington keep his army from disbanding.  The French also lent 
the American cause legitimacy because they were an established nation.  During the 
remaining years of the conflict the assistance that France gave Congress and Washington 
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aided tremendously in the final outcome.  It was the French ships at Yorktown that 
helped the army trap General Cornwallis and force him to surrender.50   
The Battle of Yorktown would prove to be the final conflict in the Revolutionary 
War, but Washington would confront one final crisis within his army before the official 
end of the conflict.  The eighteen-month lag in activity between the battle of Yorktown 
and the official end of the war in April 1783 caused problems for Washington.  Those 
officers who had signed up after the half-pay agreement by Congress during Valley Forge 
complained about their pension because their service amounted to five, not seven years.  
Washington supported his officers and troops before Congress, which did little but debate 
about the issue for two years.  Congress finally stated in December 1781 that they would 
not award back pay or pensions because the treasury was empty and the states could not 
be further taxed.  The result was on December 29, 1782, a petition was presented to 
Congress by General McDougall, Colonel Mathias Ogden, and John Brooks signed by 
officers in the Continental Army.51
Despite the pleas of General McDougall and others, Congress did nothing to 
appease the officers.  As a result, on March 10, 1783, the officers posted the Newburg 
Address, which was a direct threat to the stability of the United Colonies.  The officers 
threatened to order their men to march on Philadelphia and take charge of Congress, or 
not disband after the war was over, leaving a leaderless, angry, standing army.  Either 
way the officers who wrote the Newburg Address threatened to undo everything that all 
the previous years of effort had procured.  Washington immediately called upon 
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Congress to honor the commitments it had made to the troops and officers, but in the end 
it would be Washington who stopped the officers’ revolt.  
On March 15, just as the situation was about to become chaotic, Washington 
addressed the officers in a meeting.  Washington’s actions on this day have become 
legendary.  After reading an ineffectual speech, Washington attempted to read a letter he 
had recently received from a member of Congress but stumbled over the words and had 
to resort to putting on his spectacles.  Washington then remarked, “Gentlemen you must 
pardon me, I have grown gray in your service, and now I find myself going blind as 
well.”  The effect of Washington’s simply gesture was monumental.  Officers began to 
cry because they realized the symbolic importance of Washington’s gesture, although 
Washington did not plan or intend such a reaction.  Washington finished reading the 
letter, mounted his horse, and rode off; the officers’ revolt was over.52  In the end it was 
Washington’s undying commitment to his troops and leadership qualities that saved the 
revolution one last time.     
After the Treaty of Paris formally ended the American Revolutionary War on 
September 3, 1783, Washington issued his “Farewell Order to the Armies of the United 
States” on November 2, 1783.  Washington wrote to the army that their perseverance was 
unparalleled “through almost every possible suffering and discouragement for the space 
of eight long years.”  Washington also urged the soldiers to “carry with them into civil 
society the most conciliating dispositions; and that they[soldiers] should prove 
themselves not less virtuous and useful as citizens, than they have been preserving and 
victorious as soldiers.”53  Washington served as the ultimate example of the soldier who 
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returned to civilian life after the war was over.  After he formally resigned his position of 
Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, Washington returned to his home at 
Mount Vernon.
Several scholars, including Bruce Chadwick, have argued that Washington’s war 
experience contributed heavily to the eventual formation of the office of President of the 
United States of America.  Evidence in support of this argument comes from several of 
the individuals who were closest to Washington during the war who later lobbied for the 
office during the Constitutional Convention in 1787.  Former soldiers such as Alexander 
Hamilton and James Monroe had observed Washington conduct the war under the most 
difficult circumstances all the while maintaining relationships with Congress, state 
leaders, and others.  If Congress had been more efficient in supplying the needs of the 
army perhaps the office of the president would have been extremely different or non 
existent.  Chadwick stated, “His [Washington] experience in the war had given him many 
of the skills they [Hamilton and others] believed were necessary for a national leader.”54  
Washington’s presence at the Constitutional Convention also helped to ensure that the 
new Constitution would come to fruition.   
The relationship between Washington and Congress was extremely difficult and 
tiresome because of a variety of reasons.  The foremost reason stemmed from the infancy 
of the entire operation.  Virtually every department, office, and committee had to be 
created, which naturally created problems.  Throughout the war Washington never 
stopped corresponding with Congress.  Washington, as much as anybody, helped to lend 
to Congress an air of legitimacy by always recognizing its authority.  Washington could 
have easily taken charge of the army and marched on Philadelphia, instead he saved 
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Philadelphia and Congress from an angry army.  The problems Washington faced were 
often repetitive, especially during winter-encampments, but he never abandoned 
Congress and never stopped searching for better methods of supplying the army.  The 
relationship between Washington and Congress is important because it displayed the 
mutual cooperation and distribution of power between a government that represented the 
people and the leader of that people’s army.  Perhaps if Congress had possessed more 
central authority, it could have made Washington’s job easier, but that lesson had yet to 
be learned.
38
CHAPTER 3
WASHINGTON’S MILITARY STYLE
On July 14, 1776, Lord Richard Howe sent Lieutenant Philip Brown to deliver a 
message across the bay in New York; the letter was addressed to George Washington, 
Esq.  Upon arriving in New York Brown met Joseph Reed and explained he had a letter 
addressed to Mr. Washington from Lord Howe.  Reed replied, “Sir, we have no person in 
our army with that address.”  Lord Howe tried three more times, but he could not bring 
himself to address Washington as an equal by recognizing his status as a general and 
Commander-in-Chief.  Lord Howe did modify his approach by changing the address to 
George Washington, Esq., etc. & etc.  British Captain Nisbet Balfour, who actually met 
with Washington face-to-face, tried to explain that the use “etc., etc.” was meant to 
signify “everything that ought to follow.”  Washington was quick to point out to Balfour 
that indeed “etc.” could be used to stand for “anything.”55  This minor squabble 
concerning rank and honor may not have been crucial to the actual fighting of the 
Revolutionary War, but it does reveal a glimpse into the character of General Washington 
during the early phases of the war.  The story also helps give some depth to the manner in 
which British officers viewed their adversaries.
The character, conduct, and style of George Washington during the Revolutionary 
War have always been popular topics among historians.  However, in recent histories and 
biographies concerning Washington the more human and fallible side has emerged.  No 
longer concerned with upholding the mythical status of Washington, historians such as 
David H. Fischer and John Ferling have been able to paint a more complete picture of 
Washington during his time of military service.  By examining Washington’s military 
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style of leadership in the context of his emergence as a symbol for the military and the 
United States at large, one may gain a more complete understanding of the birth an 
independent America.  Perhaps the most important concept to keep in mind when 
considering the military style of Washington is best summed up by biographer Edward 
Lengel.  “Britain and America fought the Revolutionary War with different 
understandings of tactics that originated in their diverging temperaments and material 
circumstances.”56  This chapter aims to examine the character and style of Washington’s 
leadership during the war within the concept of Lengel’s quote.
The selection of Washington as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army 
was a decision based in the politics of unification.  Many delegates, including John 
Adams, felt that the army needed a leader from outside the New England area in order to 
draw the southern colonies more closely into the conflict.  Washington’s background as a 
soldier was not the substance of legends, but he had experience nonetheless.  In 1754, 
Washington, serving as a lieutenant colonel in the Virginia militia, attacked a French 
party at Great Meadows with success.  However, a few weeks later Washington was 
forced to surrender his force at Fort Necessity, which was hastily constructed by 
Washington’s men.  The so-called Battle of Great Meadows proved to be the beginning 
of what would become a global war known as the French and Indian or Seven Years’ 
War.  Washington also accompanied General Edward Braddock on his failed expedition 
to seize Fort Duquesne.  After returning from the failed attempt on Fort Duquesne,
Washington was named leader of the Virginia militia.  Washington and his militia joined 
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with British forces in the successful conquest of Fort Duquesne in 1758, after which 
Washington resigned his commission and returned home to resume his life as a planter.57
However, as many historians including Benton Patterson have noted, when 
Washington arrived as a delegate to the Continental Congress he did so dressed in the 
manner of a soldier.  By simply wearing his uniform to these important assemblies he 
made a personal statement that could not be ignored.  No other delegate attended the 
assembly dressed in such a manner.  Washington’s demeanor and air of aloofness did not 
publicly reinforce his desire or urge to lead the army.  However, Washington never 
turned down the opportunity to lead or take part in a committee formed to investigate 
methods for designing and supplying the army.  Washington was also asked to head a 
committee designed to calculate how much money Congress would have to raise in order 
to create a military.  Washington’s military and organizational skills impressed many of 
his colleagues and lead John Adams to say Washington’s “great experience and abilities 
in military matters is of much service to us.”58  
Washington’s unanimous election to the position of Commander-in-Chief was the 
mixed result of the needs of the Continental Congress in relation to conducting a unified 
resistance against Great Britain and Washington’s experience in military matters and his 
character.  One of the key ingredients in Washington’s character that most biographers 
have identified was his aloofness, or air of disinterestedness.  Edward Lengel noted that 
Washington’s apparent lack of interest in the position was the polar-opposite attitude of  
that which was expressed by individuals such as the President of Congress John Hancock, 
and soon to be General Charles Lee.  Perhaps Washington made the biggest impression 
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upon John Adams, who, when nominating Washington for the position, noted many of 
Washington’s fine qualities including his “independent fortune, great talents and 
excellent universal character.”59  Adams later remarked in his diary, “Dignity with ease 
and complacency, the gentlemen and the soldier look agreeably blended in him.  Modesty 
marks every line and feature of his face.”  Adams was further moved to recite Dryden:
Mark his majestic fabric; he’s a temple
Sacred by birth, and built by hands divine;
His soul’s the deity that lodges there;
Nor is the pile unworthy of the god.60
Perhaps the best way to interpret the character and style of Washington is to view 
him within the context of an eighteenth century Virginia planter, in other words, on his 
own terms.  One of the best scholarly works that helps illuminate the world of the 
Virginia planter is T.H. Breen’s Tobacco Culture.  In the book Breen identifies tobacco 
as one of the major cultural influences in the Chesapeake area.  Planters both aspired to 
be and were expected to be gentlemen.  Breen noted, “Independent persons, it was 
believed, stood above the scramble after power and wealth and thus seemed ideally suited 
to provide leadership for the small planters.”  Breen also noted that more often than not 
planters were simply keeping up a façade of autonomy and independence because of their 
accumulating debts to English merchants.61
Washington’s experience as a planter also honed his skills as a director and 
manager of great and small tasks.  At Mount Vernon, Washington oversaw the planting, 
building, and maintenance of the plantation, a job that consumed most hours of his day.  
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Breen also noted in Tobacco Culture the shear size of the undertaking of running a 
successful plantation.  Tobacco was a year-round occupation that left little spare time and 
dictated the pace of the planter’s life.  In the years prior to the start of the Revolutionary 
War, Washington switched from cultivating tobacco to wheat.  The relative ease of 
growing wheat shocked Washington because he now had “free time” to pursue more 
leisurely, relaxing, and fun activities.62  The experience of maintaining a plantation no 
doubt gave Washington excellent managerial skills, which coupled with his, albeit brief, 
military experience, caused those around him in Congress to entrust him with the position 
of leadership for the newly created military.
One of the defining aspects of Washington’s style of leadership was the openness 
of his system.  Washington’s less-restricted brand of leadership manifested itself early in 
the war during the Siege of Boston in the form of a round, plump bookseller named 
Henry Knox.  Knox had no military experience before the coming of the Revolutionary 
War but he quickly signed up with the Boston Grenadier Corps and consumed every book 
he could locate concerning military and artillery tactics.  Three days after arriving at 
Cambridge and officially assuming command of the army Washington met Knox at the 
defenses of Roxbury.  Knox made quite an impression on Washington, enough to 
convince Washington to allow him to go after and retrieve artillery at Fort Ticonderoga, 
which had been abandoned after Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen captured it from 
British control on May 10, 1775.   David McCullough stated:
That such a scheme hatched by a junior officer in his twenties who had no 
experience was transmitted so directly to the supreme commander, seriously 
considered, and acted upon, also marked an important difference between the 
civilian army of the Americans and that of the British.  In an army where nearly 
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everyone was new to the tasks of soldiering and fighting a war, almost anyone’s 
ideas deserved a hearing.63
Whatever notions Washington had about leading an army based on traditional 
standards of eighteenth century warfare quickly diminished upon his arrival.   What 
Washington had perceived to be a simple task of taking stock and collecting 
information concerning the army proved to be an eight-day affair that was by no 
means totally accurate.  In a letter to Richard Henry Lee dated July 10, 1775,
Washington spelled out his troubles stating “I am ashamed to look back at the time 
that has elapsed since my arrival here.”  Washington ended the letter by promising 
his full effort to construct an efficient military but was hesitant to guarantee any 
results.64  Certainly, the “newness” of the entire military effort caused problems for 
efficient management, but the cultural divide between Washington, the Virginia 
planter, and the bulk of the army surrounding Boston, which was largely made of 
New Englanders, caused problems as well.
The notions of what constituted a gentleman were firmly implanted in the 
mind of Washington when he took command of the troops around Boston, and what 
he saw shocked him.  Rather than possessing the same qualities of aloofness and 
distance, New England officers often shaved the faces and shined the shoes of 
common soldiers.  Many officers and soldiers casually referred to each other by their 
first names.  The army around Boston was composed of various militia groups that, 
in the past, had served more a social function than as serious military organizations.  
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Because militia groups tended to be more socially oriented, punishment for “war-
crimes” such as desertion and falling asleep on the job were dealt with rather lightly 
or not at all.  Washington’s authority was initially met with some resistance; John 
Ferling accurately noted that “these farmers and artisans who were resisting British 
centralization sometimes were just as loath to surrender their personal freedom and 
independence to an American officer.”65
As if these problems were not enough for Washington’s mind to fathom, he 
had one more culture shock in store; African-Americans were also part of the army 
around Boston.  Initially Washington reacted to the situation by stating no African-
Americans, or young boys for that matter, could serve in the military.  But, in the 
weeks that followed, Washington was forced by want of soldiers to rescind his prior 
decision and allow African-Americans to serve in what McCullough referred to as a 
“landmark general order.”  Washington’s decision to allow African-Americans to 
serve demonstrated that he was willing to let go of at least some of his inherent 
biases and notions of what constituted a proper eighteenth century military.  
Washington’s army has been described as a rabble in arms, but “it was the first 
American army and an army of everyone, men of every shape and size and   
makeup.” 66
Despite Washington’s willingness to make exceptions to his standard notions 
of what constituted an army, he ran the army with complete control.  Upon arriving 
at his headquarters in Cambridge on July 4, 1775, Washington issued the second 
“General Order” of the war, which laid down strict laws of conduct.  Washington 
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realized that he needed to gain some kind of control over the army and decided to 
start at a basic level.  Officers were instructed to ensure the cleanliness of their 
soldiers and soldiers were expected to mind their manners and attend “divine 
Service.”67  Washington’s time spent in politics and war had instilled in him a belief 
that discipline was necessary if an army was to be successful.  In 1759, as leader of 
the Virginia Militia, Washington wrote to his officers, “Discipline is the soul of an 
army.  It makes small numbers formidable, procures success to the weak, and esteem 
to all.”68 Washington applied the same formula for discipline to the Continental 
Army that he ordered for the Virginia Militia in 1759.  However, in 1775 
Washington found himself aiming his guns at the British soldiers.  Thus, the size of 
Washington’s task in bringing order to his hodgepodge of troops was great and the 
risk of complete disaster was even greater.
The military power that Washington faced in defending the “United Colonies 
of North America” was nothing short of the greatest military power in the world.  
Some historians have tended to overstate the advantages that the British possessed 
over the American forces, but, to be sure, they were a well trained force that was 
supplied by a wealthy, established nation.  The British Regulars were in many ways 
completely different from Washington’s army.  British Regulars served for life, and 
most had fought battles across the globe, which must have caused many Regulars to 
view America as just another battlefield.  The British military also possessed various 
Scottish Highland Regiments that were known for their fierce tactics and dedicated 
soldiers.  But perhaps the best example of the differences between the military 
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makeup and approach to the war was the British Government’s attempts to hire 
mercenaries.  British ministers got quotes on how much it would cost to hire Hessian 
soldiers from various Germanic states, but were initially reluctant to pay such a high 
price.  After being turned down by Catherine the Great, Frederick the Great, and 
Moors in Morocco, British ministers opted to pay the high price and hire mercenaries 
from Hesse-Cassel and other principalities.69  
The actual pacification of the colonies by the British military posed several 
problems that eventually grew worse. George Billias broke down the British military 
effort in America into two very general phases.  Phase one may be referred to as the 
“colonial phase,” and lasted roughly from 1775 to 1778.  Billias identified two major 
problems during this phase, first the military aggression in the American colonies 
and second, the domestic feuding that was brought about over the disagreement on 
foreign policy and military intervention.  “Phase two” refers to the remainder of the 
Revolutionary War and marks a clear departure from “phase one” because the 
problems English ministers and the British military encountered were of a global 
nature.  America was no longer officially fighting alone after 1778 when France and 
Spain joined the war, causing the conflict to spread globally.  Billias stated, 
“Between the first and second phases, the character of the war was completely 
changed.”70
The conditions of the opening year of the war caused great uncertainty for 
Washington, a feeling that would remain with him throughout the remainder of the 
war.  But, despite facing a superior force that was well trained and to a large extent 
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professional, Washington possessed some advantages that would help level the 
playing-field.  Perhaps the best advantage that Washington had working in his favor 
was the geographic location and size of the North American continent.  The eastern 
coast of North American extended for over three-thousand miles, which meant that 
the British military had to endure an enormous, exhaustive, and costly process if they 
were going to pacify America.  In conjunction with the coast-line, the shear size of 
the thirteen colonies caused the British military to be spread thin, a fact that only 
worsened as the conflict spread throughout other countries.71  If Washington did not 
realize these advantages before entering the conflict, it did not take long before he 
was well aware of what the enemy had to do to achieve success, but Washington also 
had to manage his own personal feelings and emotions.
The style Washington employed to fight the Revolutionary War has been 
portrayed differently throughout popular history.  Many views emphasize the use of 
non-traditional tactics such as soldiers hiding behind trees and in the cover of foliage 
in order to achieve a surprise attack.  Such explanations site the geographic location 
and lifestyle of the colonies as reasons for the change in tactics.  While such an 
assessment may contain certain aspects of truth, in the end, it leads one to assume 
that Washington happily chose a mode of combat that has been described as guerilla 
warfare.  Such an assessment overlooks some of the central conflicts that troubled 
Washington internally and challenged his natural impulses and inclinations to think 
on a much larger scale.  John Ferling summed up Washington’s mindset toward war: 
                                                
71 Billias, ed., George Washington’s Opponents, xv.
48
“Always he [Washington] longed to execute a brilliant stroke, always he thought in 
terms of the grand and audacious gesture.”72
Edward Lengel went so far as to compare Washington with Ulysses S. Grant; 
and while such a comparison may be incompatible, both generals did not like being 
idle and preferred some kind of action.  Lengel sites the willingness of Washington 
to periodically take dangerous risks and throw “caution to the winds.”  Lengel 
suggested that if General Howe had been as aggressive as Washington the war might 
have ended in favor of the British and as early as 1776.73  The year 1776 brought 
highs and lows to the leadership of the military.  In April the British army was forced 
out of Boston.  In July the Declaration of Independence was signed, which changed 
the nature of Washington’s fight from a war of restoration to a war for independence.  
However, the British returned to mount duel offensives in the summer.  The first was 
an unsuccessful attack on Charleston, South Carolina, the second was an offensive 
campaign aimed at New York.  The New York Campaign presented Washington 
with serious military choices and challenged his ability to be a successful leader.
Washington was aware well ahead of time that when the British returned
New York was likely where they would launch their campaign.  Thus, Washington 
sent General Charles Lee to examine the layout of New York and its harbors so that 
a general plan of defense could be created.  Lee replied that whoever commanded the 
water commanded New York and recommended the burning of New York City.  
Although Washington may have privately agreed with Lee’s assessment, neither he 
nor Congress had the gumption to order the burning of New York.  When 
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Washington arrived he found the recommendations for defense that Lee had 
suggested (other than burning the city) were not progressing, which was partly the 
result of Lee’s reassignment to the defense of Charleston.  Once Washington arrived 
in early April, the discipline of the army was restored and they spent the next four 
months digging- in for battle.74
In a letter to the President of the Continental Congress dated July 10, just 
before Howe arrived in New York, Washington informed Congress of his intentions.  
Washington began the letter by stating he had had the newly created Declaration of 
Independence read before the army but quickly moved on to military matters.  
Washington specifically referred to various groups of islanders around the “Jerseys” 
who anxiously awaited the arrival of the Howe brothers.  Whatever notions 
Washington had about abandoning New York and fighting a guerilla war initially 
took a backseat to achieving some great blow to the enemy.  Washington wrote:
If our Troops will behave well, which I hope will be the case, having every thing 
to contend for that Freemen hold dear, they [enemy] will have to wade thro’ 
much Blood and Slaughter before they can carry any part of our Works, if they 
carry them at all; and at best be in possession of a Melancholy and Mournful 
Victory.75
The arrival of the British fleet in July brought a change of leadership for the 
British military.  Sir William Howe, commander of the British army and his brother, 
Lord Richard Howe, Admiral of British Navy, issued a statement upon their arrival 
offering full-pardon to those “who may have departed from their allegiance and duty 
to his majesty.”  It was also during this time that Washington refused to accept the 
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correspondence of Lord Howe because of Howe’s reluctance to address Washington 
“in the character he respectively sustained.”  Washington also survived an attempt 
made by several “double-agents” to assassinate him and several other officers.  
Washington responded by ordering the execution of two of the three conspirators.76  
Despite being forced to lead the army in a precarious situation, made worse by the 
sickness spread throughout his army, Washington kept his senses and was still 
thinking in terms of achieving some great success.
That success however was not to be found in New York.  The New York 
Campaign proved to be one of the lowest points of Washington’s military career, 
punctuated by the fall of Fort Washington on November 16, 1776.  Washington and 
other officers made many decisions based on faulty information, which, along with 
the strength of the enemy, lead to the Continental Army’s defeat at Long Island in 
late August.  Washington and his army were in a dilemma at Brooklyn Heights while 
General Howe continually advanced siege lines.  Perhaps the only bright spot during 
the entire New York Campaign for Washington was the successful night crossing of 
the East River, a feat that many thought was impossible.  Because of the intervention 
of the weather, the retreat was kept secret from both the British Army and Navy.77  
The crossing of the East River became the first of many daring escapes that 
Washington would lead the army through.
Despite the success of the evacuation of Long Island, New York City fell into 
Howe’s hands on September 16, and after the Battle of White Plains in late October, 
Washington was forced to retreat and take refuge in the Hudson Highlands.  Before 
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Howe invaded New York City by way of Kip’s Bay on September 15, Washington 
wrote a letter addressed to the President of Congress on September 8 describing his 
position and outlining a specific plan of action that called for restraint and 
consideration.  Washington acknowledged that Howe’s plan was to encircle him on 
the Island of New York and “oblige us to fight them [British] on their own terms.”  
Washington continued by saying: 
In deliberating on this question it was impossible to forget, that History, our own 
experience, the advice of our ablest Friends in Europe, the fears of the Enemy, 
and even the Declarations of Congress demonstrate, that our Side of the War 
should be defensive…That we should on all Occasions avoid a general 
Action…unless compelled by a necessity, into which we ought never be 
drawn.78  
However, after the Battle of White Plains, General Nathanael Greene convinced 
Washington to let him continue to occupy Fort Washington.  Fort Washington was 
located on the east side of the Hudson River across from Fort Lee, located in New 
Jersey.  Holding Fort Washington meant that Washington would negate his plan to 
execute a defensive war and only engage the enemy under favorable conditions.  The 
Continental Army paid a heavy price for Washington’s willingness to go along with 
Greene’s plan on November 16, 1776, at Fort Washington.  “As the full weight of 
the disaster fell upon him [Washington], he turned away from his lieutenants and 
began to weep.”79
Despite the terrific losses that the Continental Army sustained in the New York 
Campaign the fight still continued and Washington was anxious to make something 
positive happen.  After retreating through the Jerseys, Washington found his 
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opportunity at Trenton.  Much has been written about this now mythical event in 
which Washington lead his troops across the Delaware River on December 26, 1776, 
but one of the most interesting military facts concerning the entire operation is often 
overlooked.  Jac Weller’s study of the crossing of the Delaware pointed out that 
Washington’s decision to make the artillery a priority in the planned assault on 
Trenton resulted in the subsidizing of the infantry, a tactic that was unheard of during 
the eighteenth century.  The weight and quantity of artillery made the crossing of the 
Delaware even more difficult than it would have been and, combined with the cold 
and wet weather, caused Washington to run behind schedule.  According to Weller’s 
study, armies generally carried two or three pieces of artillery for every one thousand 
soldiers on foot.  Washington’s decision to use more artillery stemmed from his 
desperate situation and desperate need to attack.  Artillery was considered a “wet 
weather” weapon, while muskets could prove troublesome or impossible to shoot in 
wet weather.80  The gamble proved successful for Washington.
The Battle of Trenton represented an opportunity for Washington to go after that 
grand stroke of brilliance and deliver a crushing defeat while still technically 
adhering to his policy of not risking the overall security of the army.  In his study, 
Washington’s Crossing, Fischer compared the leadership of Washington and General 
Charles Cornwallis after the second Battle of Trenton and his findings revealed a 
marked difference between the two commanders’ styles.  Cornwallis represented the 
ideal English officer/gentleman who was born into nobility, schooled with others of 
the same noble birth, and accustomed to being heard by, not listening to others.  
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Fischer stated that Cornwallis “was not merely a leader but a ruler…His [Cornwallis] 
meeting was less a council than a court.”  In a meeting on January 2, General 
William Erskine urged Cornwallis to attack before Washington had the chance to 
escape.  Cornwallis would not adhere to such a plan because it ran contrary to his 
style, which avoided nighttime attacks especially in terrain that was unknown.  
Cornwallis’s reasoning was based in traditional eighteenth century notions of 
warfare, but his failure to listen to his fellow officers cost him the opportunity to 
capture Washington and possibly put an end to the American Revolution.81
On the other hand, Washington’s council was the polar opposite.  The meeting, 
like his military system, was open and had a free-flowing feel.  The public was even 
invited to come and take part.  General Arthur St. Clair, who was present at the 
meeting, stated that Washington began the meeting by addressing the problem and 
then seeking advice.  Whereas Cornwallis had proposed his recommended course of 
action, Washington recommended none and listened to the opinion of the various 
officers and soldiers in attendance.  St. Clair proposed a plan that called for a retreat 
to Princeton followed by an attack on the enemy’s rear.  The plan was reinforced 
when locals offered their service as guides.  Washington thought highly of the plan 
because it allowed for a fighting retreat, which was good for morale and his 
reputation.  Fischer concluded by stating:
The Americans improvised a different system of command.  It was forced 
upon them by the diversity of cultures in the country, by the pluralism of elites, 
by a more open polity, by a less stratified society, and especially by expanding 
ideas of liberty and freedom.  The man at the center was George Washington.82
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Despite the failure at Fort Washington that could be attributed to Washington’s style 
of taking military advice, he did not abandon his system of leadership.  Fischer’s 
study of the two councils at Trenton demonstrated Washington’s willingness to listen 
and learn.
After the success of the Battles of Trenton and Princeton both armies settled 
into winter quarters.  Washington chose Morristown, New Jersey as the Continental 
Army’s site because of its close proximity to the then capital of Philadelphia.  The 
winter-encampment was harsh on the Continental Army; many were affected by 
diseases and famine.  However, the winter-encampment did give Washington time to 
organize his total force and gather returns from troops stationed in Rhode Island, 
New York, and other areas.  Washington also used the time to confer with officers on 
strategy, which helped contribute to Washington’s plans for the spring campaign.  
Washington also faced another problem at Morristown, and his response reveals a 
side of Washington’s leadership that is often overlooked.
One of the most vexing problems Washington was forced to deal with at 
Morristown was Loyalists.  Despite Morristown’s reputation as a patriot stronghold, 
the surrounding areas were home to many Loyalists.  Bruce Chadwick estimated that 
the total number of Loyalists in New Jersey was about nineteen thousand.  Some 
Loyalists, or Tories, plundered the homes of rebels, but all refused to send aid to the 
army, and, worst of all, Washington feared many of them were spies.83  In a letter 
written to Congress on February 5, 1777, Washington proposed the institution of an 
oath of allegiance to the revolutionary cause.  Washington opined in the letter “I 
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have often thought the States have been too negligent in this particular and am more 
fully convinced of it from the Effect Genl Howe’s excursion has produced in New 
Jersey.”  Washington was placing some of the blame for the army’s lack of local 
support on the states and he wanted Congress to ensure every state enact a loyalty 
oath “without exception, and to out law those that refuse it.”84
Washington’s desire for an oath of allegiance was born from his desperate 
situation and his desire to be in complete control.  However, Washington did not 
exercise executive authority; rather Congress passed the oath, followed by all the 
colonies.  Opposition to the oath was based on the argument that such an oath was 
totalitarian in nature and violated civil rights.  Abraham Clark, a New Jersey 
Legislator, stated that Washington had “assumed the legislative and executive 
powers of the government in all states.”  Washington often used dubious tactics to 
ensure harsh measures were taken and examples were made of the worst Loyalists. 
Committees in New Jersey and New York were formed specifically for the purpose 
of hunting Loyalists.  Many individuals were held in jail without evidence for long 
periods of time.  John Duyckman was one such prisoner who was held in jail for two 
months without ever being charged with a single crime.85  The loyalty oath displayed 
the willingness of Washington to suspend traditional rights to individuals in the 
name of safety and protection for the military.  The situation at Morristown clearly 
demonstrated that the army was the heart of the revolutionary cause and everything 
had to be done to ensure its survival.
                                                
84 Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, Vol. VII, Jan. 1777-April 1777, 105-106.
85 Chadwick, George Washington’s War, 121-122.
56
The winter at Morristown was hard on both Washington and the army but 
they managed to come out with renewed vigor.  However, the following spring 
campaign would press Washington’s strategy of a war of posts.  Despite the efforts 
of the military at Brandywine Creek on September 11, 1777, the American capital of 
Philadelphia was captured by the British.  Traditionally, when an opponent captured 
its enemy’s capital the war was over, but the Revolutionary War was not a traditional 
war in that sense.  Washington soon realized that the loss of the capital was not that 
staggering, Congress was still functioning and the army was composed and waiting 
within striking distance of the enemy.  However, a few officers began to doubt the 
leadership ability of Washington.  Adjutant General Timothy Pickering blasted 
Washington for being indecisive and questioned his military merit.  Washington 
responded by suggesting an attack on the village of Germantown, located outside of 
Philadelphia.86
The Continental Army did not achieve a victory at the Battle of Germantown, 
but the defeat did little to dampen the spirit of Washington.  In a letter to Congress 
written the day after the battle Washington reported that he ordered the attack after 
receiving information that Howe had detached some of his troops to the forts on the 
Delaware.  The reduced level of troops provided Washington with an opportunity to 
attack the post at Germantown with little risk.  Despite early success in the battle a 
group of British soldiers held up in Mr. Chew’s House, which caused chaos behind 
the Continental front lines.  The soldiers at the Chew House, coupled with 
“extremely foggy” weather conditions, caused the chance for victory to slip away, 
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and army had to retreat.  Most importantly, however, Washington added that the 
British were “nothing the better by the event,” and that the troops “gained what all 
young troops gain by being in Action.”  The next day, October 6, Washington 
thanked his officers and troops and reminded them that “the enemy are proof against 
a vigorous attack, and may be put to fight when boldly pushed.”87
Washington entered winter quarters at Valley Forge with newfound 
confidence in his army and his approach to war.  The fact that Washington was 
willing to accept multiple defeats, in the traditional sense of the term, and still 
maintain morale displayed the growth of Washington’s style over the years of the 
war.  The winter at Valley Forge proved to be one of the worst throughout the entire 
war and challenged Washington’s ability as a leader.  Cold weather was not the 
problem at Valley Forge; in fact the warmer conditions may have contributed to the 
spreading of diseases.  The problem stemmed from poor lines of transportation that 
led to famine throughout the camp.  One estimate places the number of soldiers who 
died in continental hospitals during the winter at Valley Forge at three thousand.  It 
has also been estimated that between September 1777 and March 1778 Washington 
lost about half of his fighting force.  As if these problems were not enough for 
Washington to deal with, the so-called Conway Cabal also transpired during this 
time.88  Despite these setbacks and harsh conditions, the Continental Army marched 
out of Valley Forge a new army, thanks to the efforts of Washington and a new 
officer, Baron Von Steuben.
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Baron Von Steuben arrived at Valley Forge in late February with some 
acclaim.  He had fought in the armies of Frederick the Great and was highly touted 
by Benjamin Franklin.  However, Steuben had been out of the military for a number 
of years and was only a half-pay captain, despite his recommendation to Congress 
stating he was a lieutenant general.  Washington was impressed by Steuben’s act of 
refusing a fixed command and allowed him to discipline and train the Continental 
Regiments.  Although Washington did not speak German or Steuben English, the 
communication system worked rather well through Washington’s French secretary 
Pierre Duponceau, Colonel Henry Laurens, and Lt. Colonel Alexander Hamilton.  
Steuben was successful in molding the military into a smooth fighting machine that 
operated from a common set of instructions.  Steuben began on a very small scale, 
working with small groups and, in effect, turning them into teachers as well.89  
Steuben’s new system created light infantry companies that were designed to engage 
in wilderness skirmishes.  The marching and parade tactics that Steuben had the 
army practice regularly also helped to draw the men’s attention away from the 
desperate conditions of camp life.  Despite being faced with multiple problems 
throughout the winter, Washington and the Continental Army were very much 
alive.90
Baron Von Steuben’s experience at Valley Forge signified three important 
aspects of Washington’s style of leadership.  First, the openness of the system that 
had always existed since the first day Washington arrived in camp, second  
Washington’s willingness to listen to others and act upon their suggestions.  Bruce 
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Chadwick noted it is likely that Washington thought it would take a great deal more 
than one Prussian officer to get the army into shape.  However, simply because he 
gave Steuben a chance, the army grew in maturity by leaps and bounds.  Chadwick 
also noted that in the Continental Army many soldiers hated foreigners, but 
Washington’s open system allowed Steuben the opportunity to gain the soldiers 
respect.91  The third aspect of Washington’s leadership style was his willingness to 
rely on foreign officers.  Other foreign officers such as the Marquis de Lafayette 
became close to Washington and played a vital role in the eventual outcome.
In June 1778, while still encamped at Valley Forge, an opportunity presented 
itself to Washington and the army.  In response to the trappings of Philadelphia and 
the threat of the French Navy, General Henry Clinton, who had replaced Howe as 
commander-in-chief, decided the British should remove themselves to New York.  
On June 19 the American army left Valley Forge and traveled parallel to the British.  
The next day Washington met with his officers and staff and informed them that he 
wanted to attack in force.  General Charles Lee roundly rejected the plan and, with 
the exception of Hamilton, had the support of the rest of the officers in the room.  
Then Nathanael Greene suggested an attack on the enemy’s flank and rear with light 
infantry and detachments for support.  The generals ordered a smaller engagement 
with fifteen hundred men on the British flanks.92
Despite being overruled by the majority in the council of war, Both Greene 
and Washington felt as though they were letting an opportunity slip through their 
grasp.  Greene desired an attack at a site near Monmouth Courthouse, which was 
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located just south of the army’s position.  Later in the evening Lafayette urged 
Washington to ignore the council of war’s advice and seize the opportunity to 
attack.93  Washington ordered Lee and his men to advance on the enemy from the 
rear and attack after he learned the British were leaving Monmouth on June 28.  
However, Lee did not have a plan and when he finally departed on Sunday he 
assured Washington that he had created a make-shift plan.  Washington immediately 
formed his own soldiers into columns and began the march to Monmouth in support 
of Lee.  When Washington arrived on the battlefield at Monmouth he had already 
passed through soldiers retreating and upon reaching Lee demanded to know what 
had happened.  Lee retorted that the troops were not able to meet the challenge.  
Washington replied, “Sir they are able and, by God, they shall do it.”94   
Washington’s actions at Monmouth on June 28, like the crossing of the 
Delaware, have grown to mythic proportions.  Many of the soldiers had never seen 
Washington that angry before.  General Charles Scott remarked, “Delightful…never 
have I enjoyed such swearing before or since.”  Before leaving, Washington also 
ordered Greene and his men to provide support in the attack as well.  When Greene 
arrived on the American right side of the attack he realized the magnitude of the 
situation: Cornwallis and seven thousand British soldiers against twelve thousand 
American soldiers, Washington had received his wish for a large scale attack.  The 
fighting lasted for several hours with each side exchanging blows until the contest 
ended in a draw.  The next day the British army resumed its march to the Hudson 
River and ultimately New York, but the Continental Army proved something to 
                                                
93 Golway, Washington’s Generals, 175-176.
94 Patterson, Washington and Cornwallis, 170-174.
61
themselves and to their enemy at Monmouth Courthouse.95  The Revolutionary War 
had been going on for over three years at this point and, far from withering, the 
Continental Army was as good as it ever was.
The Battle of Monmouth Courthouse, June 28, 1778, proved to be 
Washington’s last major battle until the Battle of Yorktown in 1781.  Washington 
and his army held their position and did not surrender to the temptation of providing 
Clinton an opportunity to defeat them in a decisive battle.  The British turned their 
attention to the south and on May 12, 1780, forced the surrender of Charleston, 
South Carolina.  Later, General Gates and his force received an overwhelming defeat 
at the Battle of Camden.  In less than four months the American southern army had 
been destroyed, rebuilt, and then destroyed again.  The third time however, would be 
a charm.  Washington recommended and Congress approved the appointment of 
General Nathanael Greene to command the army, which ultimately forced 
Cornwallis to stretch his chain of supply and eventually withdraw to the coast of 
Virginia at Yorktown.96  
  Despite the occasional or sporadic voices that spoke out against 
Washington’s style of leadership and military capabilities, Washington emerged 
from the year 1778 as the firm leader of the war effort.  Both Lafayette and Henry 
Laurens acknowledged Washington’s symbolic importance to the Revolutionary 
War.  Despite his lack of military experience, Washington was able to establish 
himself as a good military leader because he accounted for his deficiencies by 
working hard and focusing on the things he was good at, such as understanding the 
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public temper and maintaining his character.97  Gordon Wood wrote that 
Washington’s “stoicism, dignity, and perseverance in the face of seemly impossible 
odds came to symbolize the entire Revolutionary cause.”98
Washington never took his eye away from New York, perhaps it was because 
it was the scene of his biggest failure, until the late summer of 1781.  On August 1, 
1781 Washington formally abandoned his effort to raise the necessary numbers to 
conduct a siege of New York City.  Washington had hoped to recruit ten thousand 
soldiers but was only able to bring together six thousand, and combined with the five 
thousand troops under the French Count de Romambeau, stationed in Newport, was 
only able to muster roughly the same number of soldiers as the enemy.  On August 
14 Washington received a letter notifying him that Admiral De Grasse was headed to 
the Chesapeake with over three thousand French troops plus artillery and 
cavalrymen.  Washington wrote to Lafayette, who was in the Chesapeake, and told 
him to keep Cornwallis stationary.  Days later Washington’s army left for 
Yorktown.99
Washington faced one major problem when he decided to advance his army 
toward Yorktown: If Clinton knew of his plans he could attack Washington from the 
rear and possibly defeat the entire Continental force in a decisive battle.  Washington 
decided to “roll the dice” and risk the attack, but covered his actions by first moving 
his army toward Manhattan so to give the appearance of an attack.  Washington 
assumed that Clinton thought New York was his objective.  Even so, Washington did 
not inform the army of the destination, and many had no clue that they were 
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marching to Virginia until Washington turned his army south through New Jersey.  
Clinton did believe Washington’s goal was New York, but just in case Washington 
left General William Heath and 2,500 troops to cover his rear.  Washington had one 
final problem to consider before he could finally execute the grand stroke of 
brilliance he had always longed for: the money to pay his soldiers.  However, 
Admiral De Grasse assured Washington that the army would be paid with gold coins 
upon his arrival.100  On October 19, 1781, George Washington finally realized his 
dream when Cornwallis was forced to surrender his entire army at Yorktown.  The 
defeat essentially meant the end of the American Revolution, although sporadic 
fighting continued for nearly two years.
Perhaps Washington’s greatest act as leader of the Revolutionary War came 
at the end when he personally put an end to an officer’s revolt that threatened the 
progress of the revolutionary cause.  His address to the officers in response to the 
Newburg Address unintentionally stopped the revolt because his steadfast loyalty to 
the army and the revolutionary movement caused the officers to question their own 
desires.  Lieutenant Samuel Shaw, who was present at Washington’s address, wrote: 
“There was something so natural, so unaffected, in his appeal that it rendered it 
superior to the most studied oratory, it forced its way to the heart.”101  In the end 
Washington’s leadership was good enough to lead the “United Colonies of North 
America” to a victory over the British Empire.
Washington’s final act as a military leader has often been heralded as his 
most noble.  After successfully leading the Americans to victory, George 
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Washington resigned his commission and went home, just as he had done after the 
successful capture of Fort Duquesne in 1758.  Washington’s actions led King George 
III to state that if Washington gave up the power he possessed he “would indeed be 
the greatest man of the eighteenth century.”102  Washington did give up the power 
and returned to Mount Vernon to resume his life as a planter and husband to Martha, 
yet it would not be long before Washington would be pulled back into limelight.
George Washington’s military style of leadership can best be described as an 
evolution of technique and style that was both learned and imposed upon him.  
Throughout the war Washington constantly battled with his natural, internal call to 
action, but kept himself in check by listening to the advice of his military council. 
Washington’s system of leadership was open from the very beginning, partly 
because of the infancy of the entire military operation and partly because 
Washington sought the best advice he could get to account for his lack of military 
experience.  Most importantly, Washington was with his army from the beginning, 
through the darkest hours of the war, and at the very end.
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CHAPTER 4
WASHINGTON AND HIS OFFICERS
To better understand the role George Washington played in the Revolutionary 
War it is necessary to understand the relationships he had with his fellow officers and 
aides.  Because of the abundance of officers and soldiers who took part in the 
Revolutionary War, this study seeks to investigate those relationships that ultimately 
factored more heavily into the final outcome of the conflict or those relationships that aid 
in demonstrating specific characteristics and traits of Washington.  One of the central 
figures in this investigation, besides Washington, is General Nathanael Greene.  Greene’s 
role in the Revolution was not underestimated by his contemporaries or by historians 
since in eighteenth century.  However, by investigating the relationship of Washington 
within the context of many other officers, a more holistic interpretation of Washington as 
well as his system of management during the war may be gained.
After officially naming Washington the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental 
Army, the Continental Congress appointed the officers who were to serve along with 
him.  On June 17, 1775, Congress commissioned Artemus Ward, who was currently in 
charge of the troops in Boston, a Major-General and second in command behind 
Washington.  Charles Lee was named third in command and given the rank of second 
Major-General.  Horatio Gates was unanimously declared an Adjutant General, then 
promoted to the rank of Brigadier General  Two days later on June 19, Congress declared 
Philip Schuyler the third Major-General and Israel Putnam, also in Boston at the time, the 
fourth Major-General.  Three days later Congress expanded the number of Brigadier 
Generals by eight, naming them in order of rank as follows: Seth Pomeroy, Richard 
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Montgomery, David Wooster, William Heath, Joseph Spencer, John Thomas, John 
Sullivan, and Nathanael Greene.103  Thus, Congress successfully created the new army’s 
first nexus of officers.  However, by the end of the conflict the names that collectively 
constituted the American officer’s corps were quite different. 
Washington and his top four generals reflected the infancy of the entire military 
operation as well as the limited scope of the conflict.  Ward was placed second in 
command because he was in charge of the militia at Boston and had military experience.  
Putnam was considered something of a folk hero.  Referred to as Old Put, Putnam had 
lived a daring and wild life.  He had fought the French and Indians, wrestled wolves,
managed to survive being shipwrecked, and been one of the heroes of Bunker Hill.  
Putnam’s character and manners were essentially the polar opposite of Washington’s 
style.104  Ward and Putnam both possessed military knowledge and determination, but the 
third in command was considered by most Americans to be a military genius.  Charles 
Lee, like Horatio Gates and many others, was a former English officer who had 
immigrated to America seeking other opportunities.  Lee’s character was often at odds 
with everyone and his personal hygiene was notoriously bad. Historian Bruce Lancaster 
referred to Lee as “fantastically ugly.”  Despite his personal quirks, Lee was a proven 
soldier and generally considered by his contemporaries an asset for the Revolutionary 
cause.105
From the very beginning the experience of managing the American military 
challenged Washington to go beyond any preconceived notions of what constituted 
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proper eighteenth century behavior.  His officers, like his new army, were a hodgepodge 
of cultures and ethnicities that collectively represented a unique brand of resistance.  
Washington sought discipline and order and conducted himself in accordance with the 
norms of a great tidewater planter, which stressed the importance of self-autonomy and 
restraint.  Washington’s air of aloofness was strikingly different from the conduct and 
temperament of the New England troops.  Washington stood out.  After observing the 
arrival of Washington at Cambridge in July 1775, James Thatcher wrote:
I have been much gratified with this day with a view of General Washington.  
His excellency was on horseback, in company with several military gentlemen.  
It was not difficult to distinguish him from all others; his personal appearance is 
truly noble and majestic; being tall and well proportioned.  His dress is a blue 
coat with buff- under dress, and an elegant small sword; a black cockade in his 
hat.106
There is no doubt that Washington stood out among his troops and officers.  Almost 
everything about him was in contrast to the New England Yankees he now commanded.  
The simple fact that Washington had a uniform made him stand-out among his troops 
because most troops and officers did not have uniforms.  One of the first measures 
Washington took in organizing the army was to institute a system of ribbons to be worn 
by officers so they could be identified.107  Such as system of officer recognition was not 
to be found in the British ranks, where everyone was keenly aware of their position and 
station in the army.
Despite Washington’s character and style, which was firmly planted in the proper 
rules of gentlemanly conduct, he found himself in charge of a rag-tag army facing down 
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the world’s most powerful military force.  One of the problems that Washington faced 
early during the siege of Boston would prove to be a recurring theme: shortage of troops 
because of expiring enlistments.  Washington was forced to pressure his officers to 
encourage men to re-enlist or at least stay some amount of additional time and on 
occasion he personally addressed the troops and requested their further service.  The 
pressure was enough to cause Washington to opine “Such a dirty, mercenary spirit 
pervades the whole that I should not be at all surprised at any disaster that may happen.”  
Washington felt sorry for himself and even wished he had never accepted the command, 
but he never publicly expressed theses feelings to his troops.108  Washington’s 
willingness to embrace an open system of management helped the army to survive its
initial problems.  His willingness to accept such a system was a result of the desperate 
situation he faced while trying to create a functioning army. 
Perhaps the two best examples of the openness of Washington and the Continental 
Army’s system were Nathanael Greene and Henry Knox.  Greene and Knox had no 
significant military experience prior to 1775, but both played vital roles in the outcome of 
the Revolutionary War.  Washington first met Henry Knox at Roxbury when he was 
visiting the various defenses around Boston.  Before the start of the war Knox was the 
owner of a local bookstore in Boston that was often visited by Tories and British troops 
and officers.  However, Knox was staunchly in favor of the revolutionary movement and 
began reading as many books as possible concerning military warfare.  Knox focused a 
good portion of his research on the mechanics and techniques of operating field artillery.  
Knox also became a member of the Boston Grenadier Corp, but just as his military career 
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was beginning he suffered an injury while bird hunting that could have prohibited him 
from ever becoming an officer.  Knox’s gun exploded in his hand which caused his third 
and fourth fingers to be ruined.  Traditionally, men who suffered from physical defects 
were not allowed to become officers, but Washington’s army was not traditional in that 
sense.  On July 5, Washington met Knox at Roxbury and was impressed enough by this 
meeting to invite Knox to dinner.  Knox wrote, “General Washington fills his place with 
vast ease and dignity, and dispenses happiness around him.”109
Knox made a good impression on Washington and others as well.  Samuel Adams 
noted the ingenuity of Knox and Joseph Waters in their defenses at Roxbury.  Adams 
went so far to write that “We were told here [Philadelphia] that there were none on our 
camp who understood the business of an engineer or anything more than the manual 
exercises of the gun.”  Adams was partially correct; until Knox the Continental Army did 
not have any real talented leadership in the artillery corp.  Colonel Richard Gridley, who 
commanded the artillery, was a veteran of the French and Indian War and despite being 
only fifty-four years old was in terrible health. Washington soon realized that he had to 
do something about the artillery unit and wrote to Congress recommending that Knox 
replace Gridley.  Congress accepted the advice of Washington and named Knox head of 
the army’s artillery.  The first problem that Knox encountered was the lack of artillery, so 
he came up with a plan to salvage artillery that had been abandoned at Fort Ticonderoga 
after the campaign of Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen.  Washington agreed to the plan 
and soon sent Knox on his way to the north end of Lake George to Fort Ticonderoga.110
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The fact that Knox, who until the Revolutionary War had no experience, became 
the head of the Continental Army’s artillery department and had his plan for retrieving 
artillery approved by Washington exemplified the openness of Washington’s leadership 
system.  Knox’s plan for retrieving the artillery was rather far fetched, but Washington 
and Knox were desperate for large guns.  Once Knox and his traveling party reached Fort 
Ticonderoga they planned to load the artillery, about 120,000 pounds worth, on boats and 
sail it down Lake George to the southern end of the lake where it was to be unloaded.  
Knox had planned on moving the artillery overland to Boston by using sleds.  The plan 
depended on the cooperation of the weather in the form of snow.  The weather did not 
initially cooperate and Knox encountered many difficulties, including nearly freezing to 
death.  Knox and his crew employed ingenuity to overcome seemingly impossible 
difficulties that the weather and terrain imposed.  The entire trip back was over 300 miles 
long and included crossing the Berkshire Mountains.  Knox had never before moved 
artillery through frozen mountain terrain, but he was ultimately successful in both scaling 
and descending mountain tops.  Knox managed to rescue one of the largest cannons that 
fell through ice and sank near the shore of the Hudson River.  In mid-December 1775 
Knox and the artillery arrived back in Boston; not a piece had been lost on the journey.  
Knox had proved that he was not only creative and resourceful but he was also 
dependable.111
Dependability was a trait that Washington held high as was demonstrated through 
his own actions and adherence to the revolutionary cause.  Dependable men were 
something that Washington desperately needed, especially in the early phases of the war.  
Knox proved to be a wise investment for Washington because he was not only 
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dependable, but also resourceful.  His eagerness and willingness to learn eventually 
landed him an important spot in the military and secured him a close personal 
relationship with Washington.  Another young man who would eventually become 
Washington’s second-in-command was a friend and frequent visitor to Knox and his 
bookstore.  Nathanael Greene was a Quaker who walked with a limp, hardly the ideal 
makings of a successful military officer, but Greene was not an ordinary person.  Knox 
and Greene’s friendship began prior to the outbreak of war and was based in the urge to 
learn the various arts of war.  Their relationship was strong and lasted throughout the war 
until Greene’s death in 1786.112
Despite the similarities between Knox and Greene, the path that Greene traveled 
was very different from that of Knox.  Greene was raised in a Quaker household 
according to traditional Quaker customs.  The Greene family had several successful 
businesses, including a forge and mill, but Nathanael yearned for intellectual knowledge.  
Nathanael’s father did not permit him to read the kind of books he wanted to, but that 
only caused Nathanael to find ways around the rules.  Nathanael did read and as he grew 
older and his father’s hold on him grew weaker he read more, but it was not until events 
on the Rhode Island coastline occurred that his thoughts began to shift toward learning 
military tactics for the purpose of actually executing them.  The burning of the British 
ships Liberty and Gaspee exemplified many of problems that led to armed conflict, but to 
Greene the matter meant something else as well.  Although it is unlikely that Greene 
actually did so, he was named as one of the suspects who boarded, then set fire to the 
Gaspee.  Before the burning of the Gaspee, Greene had levied a lawsuit against 
Lieutenant William Dudingston, Captain of the Gaspee, who had seized one of the 
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Greene family’s merchant vessels, the Fortune.  Greene’s case against Dudingston 
caused a sensation in Rhode Island and served as proof that Greene was ready to bring his 
intellectual ideas and notions into the public arena.113
In the summer of 1774, as relations between England and her American colonies 
continued to spiral out of control, Nathanael Greene joined the newly conceived Kentish 
Guard in East Greenwich, Rhode Island.  Many of Greene’s friends and neighbors joined 
as well.  Those who knew Greene well were convinced that he would be a good officer 
and they pushed for his promotion, but Greene was initially denied because of his limp.  
Greene was born with a “stiff” knee that did not bend well, but he was quite capable of 
riding and dancing.  However, to many of his comrades, he was a blemish on their 
otherwise spotless military parade.  Greene’s friends stood by his side and threatened to 
leave the guard if he was dismissed.  Greene, however, agreed to serve in the guard as a 
private which resolved the issue.  The situation caused Greene to remark that he felt 
“more mortification than resentment.”114  Despite Greene’s initial setbacks in the Kentish 
Guard, he became an important piece of the Revolutionary War puzzle.
Despite nearly being kicked out of the Kentish Guard for having a limp, within 
six months of the embarrassing affair Greene was placed in charge of the newly created 
Rhode Island Army of Observation, formed by officials in Providence after the Battles at 
Lexington and Concord.  Greene was no longer a private; he was a general despite never 
actually taking part in a battle.  Nonetheless Greene and his army marched off to Boston 
and offered their services to the leader of the Massachusetts Army, Artemus Ward.  
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Before Washington arrived at camp for the first time Greene had already caused many 
officers in the army to notice his style and his army’s discipline.  Indeed, discipline was a 
problem in the Continental Army, but Greene’s troops proved to be a model that other 
units could aspire to be.  Pastor William Emerson remarked in a letter to his wife that the 
Rhode Island troops lived in “proper tents…and looked like the regular camp of the 
enemy” as opposed to the majority of the American army that lived in “slapdash housing 
made of stone and turf.”115
When Washington arrived in camp on July 3, 1775, Greene sent a detachment of 
two hundred men with a welcome letter; Washington responded by asking to meet with 
Greene, this would ultimately prove to be the beginning of a long friendship between the 
two officers.  Both Washington and Greene were men of the enlightenment, not in the 
intellectual sense such as Thomas Jefferson, but in the sense of self-improvement through 
self-determination.  Perhaps Washington even saw a mirror image of himself in the 
young Greene.  Greene certainly held Washington in high esteem: “I hope we shall be 
taught to copy his example and to prefer the Love of Liberty in this time of publick 
danger to all the soft pleasures of domestic Life.”  One important aspect of Greene and 
Washington’s relationship that manifested itself early was Greene’s ability to treat 
Washington with the respect he demanded from the army.  Washington wrote to 
Congress that “familiarity between the officers and men” should be avoided because it 
was counterproductive.  Greene, along with others, began addressing Washington with 
the title “His Excellency,” which fit the Old World aristocratic style of Washington and 
reaffirmed his elevated position within the army.116
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Greene’s respectful behavior toward Washington was not the same behavior 
expressed by General Charles Lee and Brigadier General Horatio Gates.  Washington 
was pleased by their appointments and took for granted their loyalty to him.  However, 
despite a cordial meeting with Gates at Mount Vernon before both men donned their 
military uniforms, Washington soon expressed feelings of reserve on the part of Gates.  
Historian John Ferling noted that no evidence exists in the writings of Gates or elsewhere 
to substantiate the claim made by Washington that he treated the commander bitterly and 
eventually became “openly malevolent.”  In the time leading up to the Battle of Saratoga 
the correspondence between Washington and Gates did grow cold, particularly on the 
part of Washington and his staff.  Washington’s relationship with Lee fared better than 
with Gates during the opening years of the war.  Lee fought well at Charleston in 1776 
and at White Plains later on in the year but was captured by British soldiers in December.  
Although it is difficult to assess Washington’s feelings toward Lee after his eventual 
release fifteen months later, Nathanael Greene’s account of his return may provide some 
clue: “Hope [that] he may be of use but I apprehend no great good, as the junto will 
endeavor to debauch and poison his mind with prejudice.”117
Greene’s use of the term “junto” in his description of Lee’s arrival may also 
provide some clues to the early rift between Washington and his officers, Lee and Gates.  
During the beginning years of the war one of the most vexing questions the conflict 
posed dealt with the how the army was to be recruited.  Washington and many other 
officers, as well as congressmen, were pushing for a national army that called for long 
enlistments.  Two of the most vocal advocates for a militia based system were Gates and 
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Lee.  Very early in the war Lee expressed his opinion that the war should be very 
democratic and championed the citizen-soldier model.  It is clear that Lee wanted the 
revolution to have a deeper social impact on American life than Washington.  
Washington’s initial reluctance to accept Lee’s militia system may have been the result of 
his cultural biases, but the militia proved inefficient in the New York campaign of 1776, 
causing Washington and others to criticize it relentlessly.  On August 4, 1777, Gates was 
placed in command of the troops in New York by Congress.  His eventual success at the 
Battle of Saratoga by using defensive techniques and citizen-soldiers caused many to
question the requests of Washington for a professional army as well as his ability to 
successfully lead the army.118  The differing views on how the army was to be composed 
may have caused Washington to resent Gates and Lee because they did not adhere to 
“His Excellency’s” suggestions.
Washington wrote to Gates on October 30, 1777, after learning about the success 
of the army at Saratoga.  Washington began the letter in a congratulatory fashion but soon 
shifted his position: “I cannot but regret, that a matter of such magnitude and so 
interesting to our General Operations, should have reached me by report only.”  
Washington was upset because he had not received notification or a written report of the 
battle from Gates, a fact that seemed to cause more doubt in the mind of Washington 
concerning the loyalty of Gates.  Washington ended the letter by explaining to Gates that 
one of his aides, Alexander Hamilton, was on his way to meet with Gates and relate the 
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situation of the army at Valley Forge.119  Ferling noted: “Instead of rejoicing at the 
victory of Saratoga, Washington’s aides hurriedly spread the tale that Gates had feared to 
step on the battlefield” and that Gates “hung himself at a distance to leave an [Benedict] 
Arnold to win laurels for him.”120
During the same time that Washington wrote Gates concerning the Battle of 
Saratoga, events were unfolding that eventually led to the so-called Conway Cabal.  
Thomas Conway was born in Ireland but spent a good portion of his life fighting in the 
French military.  He joined the American war effort as a brigadier general.  Washington 
initially thought Conway might be of some good use, but his tendency to defy authority 
caused Washington to block his attempt to become a major general.  As a consequence, 
Conway became close to Gates.  On October 28, 1777, James Wilkinson, an aide to 
Gates, was at a tavern in Reading, Pennsylvania and apparently had one too many drinks 
and started to “talk.”  According to Lord Sterling, who had made the tavern his 
headquarters, Wilkinson berated Washington and exonerated Gates and told of a letter 
written by Conway to Gates in which Conway belittled Washington’s style of leadership.  
During this time a rumor was also spreading that Congress had made a list of men to 
succeed Washington, and Gates was at the top of the list, followed by Lee, Thomas 
Mifflin, and Conway.  Alexander Hamilton, then serving as an aide to Washington, 
replied to the situation by stating it was a deeply rooted, foul scheme and that Conway 
was nothing more than a “vermin.”121
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The situation only worsened when Congress decided to revamp the largely 
ineffective Board of War by placing military figures on the committee.  Gates was chosen 
to be the head of the Board of War, and Conway was chosen as its inspector general.  
Historian Jennings Sanders noted that in the mind of Washington, “Gates’ ability to cause 
trouble increased by his new position.”122  Many individuals within Washington’s circle 
were afraid that he might be losing his power, but some, such as Henry Laurens did not 
consider Gates and Conway threats.  Laurens wrote to a distraught Marquis de Lafayette, 
“Be not alarmed.  I think it is not in the power of any junto to lessen our friend without 
his own consent.”  Washington’s note to his aide John Fitzpatrick on February 28, 1778 
indicated that he was feeling better about the situation: “In a word, I have a good deal of 
reason to believe that the machinations of this junto will recoil upon their own heads.”123  
Washington and Laurens proved right in their assessments, but the suspicion on the 
behalf of Washington and the deception on the behalf of Gates revealed an oblivious split 
between certain members of the American war effort.
After the smoke cleared from the Conway Cabal in 1778 five, general officers 
emerged that Washington trusted above all others: Knox, Greene, Lafayette, Arnold, and 
Anthony Wayne.  All of these individuals had proved themselves on the battlefield and 
were willing to be loyal to Washington.  Ferling noted that three of these individuals, 
Arnold, Wayne, and Lafayette, resembled the headstrong side of Washington, who was 
willing to risk life and limb in battle and longed for great military success.  Knox and 
Greene represented something altogether different.  They were realistic in their approach 
to problem solving and showed a great willingness to learn and study the art of war.  All 
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of these men were young, talented, and willing to be a subordinate to Washington.  
Ferling noted: “Lafayette immediately noticed that the commander had surrounded 
himself with flatterers, and he fell right into step as he inched closer to Washington.”124
The rise of the Marquis de Lafayette as an important figure and friend of 
Washington during the Revolutionary War demonstrated both the openness of 
Washington’s system and his tendency to surround himself with talented young men.  
Washington first met Lafayette on July 31, 1777, when the young Frenchman came into 
camp at Germantown.  Many troops and officers in the Continental Army were weary of 
foreign individuals, especially soldiers; Washington was particularly troubled by the 
French.  He wrote, “I am haunted and teased to death by the importunity of some and 
dissatisfaction of others.”  But Lafayette was different.  His willingness to put aside his 
large aspirations of military glory in order to serve in smaller commands impressed 
Washington and convinced him that Lafayette was of high quality.  Washington was 
obviously impressed with Lafayette, and Lafayette’s willingness to yield ultimate 
authority to Washington caused him to write:
He has said that he is young and inexperienced, but at the same time has always 
accompanied it with a hint, that as soon as I shall think fit for the command of a 
division, he shall be ready to enter upon the duties of it, and in the meantime has 
offered his service for a smaller command.125
Washington’s relationship with Lafayette exemplified the qualities that he looked for 
in officers and leaders.  He was not willing to tolerate individuals bent on pursuing 
their own methods, nor was he totalitarian in his approach.  Rather, Washington 
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found it easier to work with young men who admired and respected him as opposed 
to individuals who doubted his abilities and questioned his judgment.
A specific confrontation between Washington and then aide Alexander 
Hamilton in March 1781 revealed a great deal concerning what Washington expected 
from those in his military “family.”  Hamilton had first joined Washington’s 
“family” in 1777 and was put to great use, soon becoming very close to Washington. 
But one morning in March 1781 he was late for a meeting.  When Hamilton finally 
arrived Washington scolded him by saying, “Colonel Hamilton, you have kept me 
waiting these ten minutes, I must tell you Sir you treat me with disrespect.”  
Hamilton responded by stating he did not consciously mean to offend or disrespect 
Washington, “but since you have thought it necessary to tell me so we part.” 
Washington tried to apologize later, but, Hamilton did not concede.  Instead, 
Hamilton privately confided that he never liked Washington and referred to him as 
an egocentric with a bad temper.  Although Hamilton and Washington eventually 
patched up their relationship, Hamilton privately pledged to “say many things” about 
Washington after the war was over, but he never brought that pledge to fruition.  
Hamilton, as well as other officers, often alluded to what could be considered the 
“dark side” of Washington, particularly in his dealings with Lee.   Washington was 
described by one individual as being “better endowed by nature in habit for an 
Eastern monarch, than a republican general.”126
Some of Washington’s contemporaries thought that he used Lee as a 
scapegoat at the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse on June 28, 1778.  Despite the 
advice of his military council, Washington decided to attack British General Henry 
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Clinton and his army as they abandoned Philadelphia and marched to the Hudson 
River en route to New York City.  Lee was accused by Washington of having no 
plan of battle and failing to conduct himself properly on the battlefield.  To Lee’s 
credit, he did lead the army to Monmouth Courthouse and engage the enemy, but 
only in a limited fashion.  When Clinton turned and attacked Lee, he retreated back 
to the West Ravine.  Lee’s decision did make military sense.  By staying put, Lee 
could have lost his army and by retreating to the West Ravine he enticed the enemy 
into a trap.  However, Washington perceived the situation differently when he rode 
into the battle and saw soldiers retreating.  Whether or not he actually cursed Lee is 
somewhat debatable, but no doubt Washington rallied his army and re-engaged the 
enemy in a fierce conflict that essentially ended in a draw.127  
Two days after the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse, Lee was arrested and 
charged with a court-martial on the grounds of insubordination and disobedience.  Lee 
wanted a chance to justify his actions and explain himself, but his complaints prior to his 
arrest about the manner in which Washington addressed him on the battlefield led 
Washington to allow Lee no such opportunity.  In December Congress suspended Lee 
and essentially declared him incompetent, later in 1780 Lee was formally dismissed from 
the army by Congress.128  No doubt Lee reflected on his prior assessment of 
Washington’s character: “A puffed up charlatan…extremely prodigal of other men’s 
blood and a great oeconomist of his own.”129  Both Lee and Washington had convincing 
arguments and whether or not Washington simply took the opportunity to get rid of Lee 
may never be known for certain, but Lee was gone and Gates was soon to follow.
                                                
127 Lengel, General George Washington, 304-305.
128 Lengel, General George Washington, 305-306.
129 Ferling, The First of Men, 260.
81
The Battle of Monmouth proved to be the last major military engagement 
Washington participated in until the Battle of Yorktown in October 1781.  During the 
time between Monmouth and Yorktown, Washington kept his army at bay, just outside 
the reach of Clinton and his army in New York City.  However, in 1780 Clinton decided 
to change the focus of the war from the northern to the southern theatre.  On May 29, 
1780, Major General Benjamin Lincoln was forced to surrender the southern army after 
the British successfully captured Charleston, South Carolina.  The British soon spread out 
across South Carolina and Georgia and prepared to move north.  The only obstacle in 
their way was a contingent of troops Washington had ordered to North Carolina under 
Baron de Kalb.  The south was in need of an army and someone to lead it; Washington 
thought Greene should occupy the post; Congress chose Horatio Gates.  Gates pushed 
hard for the position, but it proved to be his eventual downfall.  After arriving to find de 
Kalb’s army in desperate shape, he made a poor decision based on faulty intelligence and 
confronted the British at Camden.  The result was a massive defeat punctuated by Gates 
fleeing the field of battle for some sixty miles until he and his aides reached the security 
of Charlotte, North Carolina.  The Battle of Camden marked the end of Gates’ military 
career.130  
Within a short span of time the two military officers who some thought should 
replace Washington as commander-in-chief were no longer a part of the army.  
Washington certainly had nothing to do with Gates’ situation, but the ousting of Lee 
reveals the aggressive, perhaps vindictive approach that Washington took towards those 
who he thought were a challenge to his authority.  On September 15, 1780, Washington 
wrote a letter to Congress in which he totally rejected the notion of depending on militia 
                                                
130 Ferling, The First of Men, 277-279.
82
units to defend the south.  Washington wrote, “No Militia will ever acquire the habits 
necessary to resist a regular force.”  The only remedy for the south as far as he was 
concerned was a well disciplined and trained army.  Washington believed that militia 
units were helpful and necessary but could by no means be solely depended on to repel a 
force the size of Cornwallis’ army.  The army in the south, which was composed of the 
remains of de Kalb’s contingent, was without a leader and reeling from disaster.  Perhaps 
with that fact in mind Washington included a sentence that informed the members of 
Congress that he was traveling to Hartford to meet with the Count De Rochambeau and 
the Chevalier De Ternay, and in his absence “The command of the army…devolves on 
Major General Greene.”131  Washington certainly wanted Greene to have command of the 
southern army and employed subtle gestures such as the one above to make his point 
clear to Congress.  However, before Congress decided upon a new strategy for the 
defense of the southern army, both it and Washington were struck a treacherous blow.
Benedict Arnold was one of Washington’s favorite generals because he was a 
man of action.  In May 1775 Arnold, along with Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain 
Boys, captured Fort Ticonderoga.  Arnold won further acclaim from Washington and 
many other Americans for his daring trek from Maine to Canada through the thick 
wilderness in the winter.  When Arnold and his 600 troops reached the St. Lawrence 
River, Washington wrote Arnold congratulating him on his journey by stating he 
deserved success because of his “enterprising and persevering spirit.”  If Arnold had been 
successful in his attack on Quebec, it is likely his fame would have been much greater.  
However, his actions in the Quebec Campaign of 1775 did earn him a promotion to 
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brigadier general, but Arnold yearned for more.  The Battle of Saratoga provided another 
opportunity in which Arnold seized the initiative and played a major role in the defeat of 
General Burgoyne.  Despite Arnold’s heroics on the battlefield his reputation among his 
fellow officers was declining because of his thirst for power and misappropriations in his 
expense account.  Gates had relieved him of his command before the Battle of Saratoga 
for insubordination and afterwards Arnold was passed over in favor of five of his junior 
officers for promotion to major general.  Washington was suspicious of Arnold’s actions, 
but he had no clue as to how far Arnold planned to be disobedient.132
On March 5, 1779, Benedict Arnold appeared in Philadelphia before the Paca 
committee to defend himself against charges of misuse and mismanagement of funds
while serving as the military governor of Philadelphia.  The committee cleared him of all 
charges except two, the misuse of militia and wagons, but recommended a court martial 
on those two charges.  Arnold was livid and considered leaving his post because he felt 
deserted by Washington.  The following month Congress reached an agreement by 
allowing Washington to determine the outcome of Arnold’s case; Washington wrote 
Arnold a letter postponing the trial.  “Arnold’s old mentor, the man on whom he relied 
when his ungrateful country and its Congress deserted him, had now left him awaiting an 
indefinite sentence.”133  Arnold felt ultimately betrayed. 
During the troublesome year of 1779 Arnold also married the eighteen year old 
Peggy Shippen, the daughter of a wealthy Philadelphian family whose political 
inclinations tended to be loyalist.  Through his new bride Arnold met John Andre, an aide 
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to General Clinton, and the means for his eventual treason.134  In December 1779 Arnold 
was cleared of all his charges and given only a slight punishment by Washington, and 
later in the summer of 1780 he joined Washington’s army on the Hudson.  Arnold had 
privately been negotiating with Clinton, and on August 25, he received his reply from 
Clinton agreeing to meet his demands in exchange for the American fort at West Point.  It 
is ironic that after Arnold sold out his comrades Washington offered him the command he 
always yearned for, command of the entire left wing of the army.  Arnold adamantly 
declined the post on the grounds that his injured leg necessitated a “rear-area 
assignment.”  Washington eventually relented and gave Arnold command of West Point.  
Once Arnold was in command, he systematically weakened West Point and even 
arranged to have Washington captured when he visited the fort.  However, on September 
23, 1780, the plot was uncovered when Andre was captured by three militiamen.  Arnold 
fled and Andre was executed.  When Washington learned of the affair, it is reported that 
he turned to Henry Knox with a trembling hand and said “Arnold has betrayed me.  Who 
can I trust now?”135
The betrayal of Arnold was a hard blow to Washington because it caused him to 
doubt the loyalty of his officers and also because it exemplified many of the problems 
that were plaguing the army.  In Washington’s eyes, the system used by Congress to 
promote officers obviously needed to be refurbished because it caused many squabbles 
concerning rank, including the Conway Cabal.  Washington realized another perhaps 
more important problem that plagued the army, the lack of money and sufficient supplies.  
Many of the soldiers, like Arnold, had grown to hate civilians because in dire times of 
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need civilians tended to sell their produce and goods to others or at high prices because of 
the depreciating continental currency.  Feuds between officers and their men continued to 
be a problem that contributed to the growing distance between the “people” and the 
Continental Army.  Washington wrote, “We are daily and hourly oppressing the people-
souring their tempers-and alienating the affections.”136  Arnold’s treason hurt Washington 
because he believed in Arnold, but as he reassessed the situation afterwards the hurt only 
deepened because Arnold’s treason was born from specific circumstances that indicated 
the army was disintegrating.
Despite the troublesome times Washington could always count on one man to 
follow him into battle and follow through on his every command and that man was 
Nathanael Greene.  Greene served by Washington’s side or close by throughout the 
entirety of the war until he was called to assume command of the army in the south.  
Before he was reassigned to a command post, Greene had been the army’s Quartermaster 
General, a post that lacked the fame of a command post but often demanded twice the 
worry and work.  Despite Greene’s wishes to achieve great battlefield glory, he accepted 
the post and worked hard to create an efficient system of supply for the army.  In July 
1780 Congress adopted a plan that changed the role of the quartermaster general.  Greene 
made his suggestions clear to Congress and Congress clearly ignored all Greene’s 
suggestions, which caused him to draft his resignation from the post.  Greene was so 
angered over the situation that he failed to keep a check on temper and stated, “It is 
sufficient to say that my feelings are injured.”137
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Following Greene’s resignation from the quartermaster general post, his enemies 
in Congress, men such as Joseph Jones of Virginia, moved to get him expelled from the 
army totally.  It is not likely that Congress would have dismissed Greene from service, 
but after Washington read a letter written by Jones denouncing Greene, he decided to 
write Congress concerning the manner:
I shall neither condemn nor acquit General Green’s conduct for the act of 
resignation, because all the antecedent correspondence is necessary to form a 
right judgment of the matter, and possibly, if the account is ever before the 
public, you may find him treading on better ground that you seem to imagine; 
but this is by the bye.  
Washington explained that he feared the consequences of Congress suspending Greene:
Each will ask himself this question: If Congress, by it mere fiat, without inquiry 
and without trial, will suspend an officer to-day, and an officer of such high 
rank, may it not be my turn to-morrow? and ought I put it in the power of any 
man or body of men to sport with my commission and character, and lay me 
under the necessity of tamely acquiescing, or, by an appeal to the public, 
exposing matters which may be injurious to its interest?...It is my wish to 
prevent the proceeding; for sure I am that it cannot be brought to a happy issue if 
it takes place.138
It is clear that Washington held Greene in extremely high esteem and was not about to sit 
idle and allow a small faction to harm his character.  After the betrayal of Arnold and the 
existing problems between officers and Congress as well as officers and their soldiers, 
Washington had had enough.  His letter on behalf of Greene is somewhat moving 
because it is apparent that Washington was willing to place his own reputation on the line 
and stand by his friend.  Although Washington did not know it at the time, the man he 
wrote the letter for had yet to execute his most monumental contribution to the 
Revolutionary War.
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Washington had wanted Greene to be in charge of the army in the south ever 
since the British capture of Charleston, but Congress ultimately made those decisions, 
and it had chosen Gates.  However, after Gates was defeated at Camden, the Continental 
Army in the south was all but extinct, and Washington again recommended Greene for 
the assignment.  Washington had confidence in Greene as is evidenced by his letter to 
Greene after his resignation from the quartermaster general post: 
From that period to the present time, your exertions have been equally great; 
have appeared to me to be the result of System, and to have been well calculated 
to promote the interest and honor of your Country. And in fine I cannot but add, 
that the States have had in you, in my opinion, an able, upright and diligent 
Servant.139
On October 5, 1780, Congress resolved to create a “court of enquiry to be held on the 
conduct [of] Major General Gates, as commander in chief of the southern army,” and 
that “the Commander in Chief be and is hereby directed to appoint an officer to 
command the southern army.”140  Washington received what he had been wishing for, 
the chance to put Greene in charge and the opportunity to conduct the war with 
another powerful general who was loyal to his wishes.  On October 22, Washington 
wrote Greene a letter explaining his new task in the south.  The tone of Washington’s 
letter is at times like a father speaking to his beloved son, who, finally realizing his 
son is ready for the world sends him out with full confidence.  Washington was also 
brutally honest with Greene:
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Uninformed as I am of the enemy's force in that quarter, of our own, or of the 
resources which it will be in our power to command for carrying on the war, I 
can give you no particular instructions but must leave you to govern yourself 
intirely, according to your own prudence and judgment and the circumstances in 
which you find yourself. I am aware, that the nature of the command will offer 
you embarrassments of a singular and complicated nature; but I rely upon your 
abilities and exertions for every thing your means will enable you to effect.141
Washington obviously trusted in Greene’s ability to lead but he also trusted the 
character of Greene.  Throughout the war Greene worked hard and shared many 
problems with Washington, suddenly all that experience was put to the ultimate test.  
Greene’s rival leader in the south was Lord Charles Cornwallis, one of the most 
famous British generals.  On December 2, 1780, Greene officially took over command 
from Gates at Charlotte, North Carolina and quickly started assessing the army’s 
situation.  Greene’s time spent as a quartermaster taught him to be sensitive to the 
most important aspect of any military campaign, the supplying of the army.  Greene’s 
style had an effect on those around him immediately; Colonel William Polk remarked 
that after Greene arrived he had “by the following morning understood [supply 
problems] better than Gates had done in the whole period of his command.”142
The Revolutionary War in the south had a different character from the fighting 
that occurred in New England and in the Middle Colonies.  Many historians have 
justifiably referred to the fighting in the south as a civil war.  Many in the south felt no 
attachment to the Revolutionary War on either side because the conflict, until then, 
had largely avoided the south.  When Clinton decided to take the war to the south, the 
people were forced to decide which side they would provide support for, a decision 
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that was often based in the politics of self-interest.  Many southerners avoided 
decisions or switched sides during the campaign.  Therefore, it was important for 
Greene to procure support for the cause and root out Tory sympathizers.  Greene’s 
advice to one of his generals was “to strike terror into our enemies and give spirit to 
our friends.”  In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Greene explained that a raid by his 
troops on a group of Loyalists resulted in “a dreadful carnage of them,” but it had “a 
very happy effect on those disaffected persons of which there were too many in this 
country.”143  
Greene displayed no reluctance to do whatever it took to win the war in the south, 
even if it meant hunting down Loyalist groups or defying traditional military rules of 
engagement.  Before Greene assumed command of the army, a group of militiamen 
from the mountainous frontier marched down to meet Major General Patrick Ferguson 
at Kings Mountain on October 7, 1780.  Ferguson was killed and his entire force was 
captured or killed.  The defeat destroyed the left flank of Cornwallis’ army and caused 
problems in the recruitment of Loyalists.  Therefore, when Greene assumed command 
of the army in the south Cornwallis was in the midst of reforming his new strategy.  
Greene considered his options within the context of the south as a whole and devised 
his strategy accordingly.  Greene was joined by Daniel Morgan and “Light-Horse” 
Henry Lee.  Greene sent Lee, along with William Washington’s cavalry, to meet with 
Francis Marion on the Pee Dee River.  Greene also violated traditional military policy 
by dividing his force in the face of an enemy when he sent Morgan and 600 troops 
across the border to Cheraws, South Carolina.
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Greene’s decision proved to be correct when Morgan’s forces met with those 
commanded by Colonel Banestre Tarleton on January 17, 1781, at Cowpens, South 
Carolina.  Cornwallis was astonished to hear the news that his revamped left-flank 
under Tarleton had been destroyed again.  Cornwallis tried to catch Morgan and the 
rest of the army after Cowpens, resulting in the now famous “Race to the Dan,” but he 
was too late to catch Greene and the army before it crossed the Dan to relative safety.  
In the effort to catch Greene, Cornwallis destroyed large amounts of supplies in order 
to move quickly and lost around 200 men but had nothing tangible to show for it.  
Greene was ultimately successful in the south because he was able to blend the actions 
of his Continental force with guerilla operations led by men such as Lee and 
Marion.144
Greene learned many important lessons during his tenure with Washington.  
He learned to violate standard military techniques if the situation demanded it and not 
to judge success by ordinary military standards.  Greene learned that the army was the 
heart of the revolution, and as long as the army was alive so too was the revolution.  
At Guilford Courthouse on March 15, 1781, Greene displayed these qualities by 
removing his army from the fight despite the opportunity to execute a complete 
victory.  Greene refused to put his whole army at risk because he realized that 
Cornwallis’ main objective was his army.  Cornwallis’ army received much higher 
casualty rates than Greene’s army, a fact that caused Greene to remark that 
Cornwallis’ victory “was made at so great an expense that I hope it may yet affect 
their ruin.”  One of Cornwallis’ aides summed up Guilford Courthouse by saying the 
army had procured no good from the victory and that “the Spirit of our little army has 
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evaporated a good deal.”145  The scenario of Guilford Courthouse was repeated by 
Greene at Hobkirk’s Hill and Eutaw Springs until Cornwallis was forced to retreat to 
the coast of Virginia at Yorktown.
The Battle of Yorktown proved to be the final major battle of the 
Revolutionary War.  The Battle of Yorktown was unique because more French troops 
participated in it than Continental troops.  Washington and his army rendezvoused 
with the Count de Rochambeau and his troops from Newport and advanced to 
Yorktown where they were met by Admiral de Grasse and his fleet of ships carrying 
many French troops.146  Washington was overjoyed by the help he received from the 
French throughout the war but particularly happy at Yorktown because he recognized 
the important opportunity it presented.  Count William Deux-Ponts, second in 
command of the Deux-Ponts regiment, recalled the joy exhibited at Yorktown when 
the French fleet arrived.  Deux-Ponts wrote: 
The joy which this welcomed news produced…is more easy to feel than to 
express.  He [Washington] put aside his character as arbiter of North America 
and contended himself for the moment with that of a citizen, happy at the good 
fortune of his country.  A child, whose every wish had been gratified, would not 
have experienced a sensation more lively, and I believe that I am doing honor to 
the feelings of this rare man, in endeavoring to express all their ardor.147
Washington had reason to be happy because later on October 19, 1781, Cornwallis 
surrendered at Yorktown.  Cornwallis’ surrender ended the Revolutionary War for all 
intents and purposes.
Almost two years after the surrender of Cornwallis the Treaty of Paris 
officially ended the Revolutionary War and resulted in the recognition of the United 
                                                
145 Peterson, Washington and Cornwallis, 287-288. 
146 Patterson, Washington and Cornwallis, 305-306.
147 Gilbert Chinard, ed., George Washington as the French Knew Him: A Collection of Texts, 
(Greenwood Press, New York, 1969), 42-43.
92
States of America as an independent nation.  The final two years of the war were 
troublesome times for Washington as he struggled to keep his army together, but 
afterwards he shocked the world by resigning his commission and returning to private 
life.  Before he returned to Mount Vernon though, Washington met with his “military 
family” to say a few final words and bring closure to his experience of leading the 
army.  Washington read a speech to the army the day after the peace treaty was signed 
in which he thanked the army for their service and told them they had nothing left to 
do but “preserve a perfect unvarying consistency of character.”  However, he met with 
his officers later at Fraunces Tavern, located at the bottom of Wall Street in New York 
City.  The meeting was a heartfelt exchange between Washington and his top officers.  
Knox was speechless, perhaps for the first time in his life, and could do nothing but 
embrace Washington.  Benjamin Talmadge, leader of one of Washington’s spy rings 
remarked, “The simple thought…that we should see his face no more in this world 
seemed to me utterly insupportable.”  Washington left the tavern with tears running 
down his face and proceeded to journey back to Mount Vernon, back to private life.148
Throughout the war the various relationships that Washington had with his 
officers and aides defined the different aspects of Washington’s character and helped
illuminate the usual and unusual situations that he confronted as leader of the 
Continental Army.  At times Washington was cold and vindictive, other times he was 
warm and nurturing, a shift in attitude that reflected the internal struggle that 
Washington faced as leader.  Although some factions did exist from time to time, 
Washington was successful in creating a core of officers and aides that he trusted and 
depended on to help him fight the war.  Of those, Nathanael Greene emerged as his 
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most trusted.  Greene displayed all the qualities that Washington could have ever 
asked for in his most trusted officer when he took over the southern army and 
eventually helped bring about the surrender of Cornwallis.  Despite the distance that 
Washington tried to keep between himself and virtually everyone, his attachment to 
the cause and unyielding brand of leadership caused many of those around him to 
adore him and in the case of individuals like Knox, Lafayette, and Greene, he adored 
them back.  Washington viewed the end of the war as the end of an epoch and though 
he was happy to see the end, saying goodbye to his “military family” was painful.   
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CHAPTER 5
WASHINGTON AS SEEN BY HIS COMTEMPORARIES
George Washington had many important duties during the Revolutionary War, 
but one of his most crucial tasks was to maintain popular support for the war effort.  
Therefore, in order to achieve a holistic interpretation of Washington’s tenure as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army it is necessary to understand how various 
groups perceived Washington during and directly after the Revolutionary War.  The 
previous chapters have been dedicated to the relationships Washington had with 
Congress and his officers, as well as the manner and style by which Washington led the 
army, but this chapter seeks to understand how his contemporaries felt about him and his 
leadership.  By consulting the opinions of various colonial Americans from both sides of 
the conflict, an understanding of how Washington was perceived may be gained. That 
Washington became a mythic figure as generation after generation of Americans 
venerated his name and character is undeniable and in that respect this examination will 
help to shed light on the initial development of Washington as a symbol for the United 
States and its citizens.  
The rise of Washington to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Continental 
Army was unique when compared with other revolutionary movements because the 
initial reaction of the colonies was to form a large committee, known as the Second 
Continental Congress.  Washington had been a member of the First Continental Congress
but remained silent for the most part, allowing his reputation as a soldier and successful 
gentleman to make the biggest impression on his new colleagues.  At the Second 
Continental Congress, Washington served on several committees concerning military 
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affairs, all the while dressed in his striking military uniform that he wore as leader of the 
Fairfax Militia in Virginia.  Washington’s military exploits were not the stuff of legends, 
but that did not seem to bother his colleagues in Congress.  Washington’s appointment as 
leader of the Continental Army was representative of a shift in the colony’s approach to 
resisting British authority.  Washington was very popular before he officially assumed 
command in Boston, a fact that supports the statement, “His appointment was in effect a 
decision for war, and the people who agreed with that decision expressed their support by 
praising its executor.”149
Despite the shift to war the representatives and those who supported the war at 
large did not necessarily see military experience as the most important factor in choosing 
Washington as leader.  The likes of leaders such as Oliver Cromwell were still fresh in 
the minds of many Americans and they looked for something else in their chosen leader: 
character.  Americans who were pro-war were interested in choosing a leader they could 
trust to represent and execute the war according to their notions of shared authority.  
Americans during this time also feared the thought of a standing, professional army.  
Charles Lee was certainly more experienced in military matters, but his character and 
status as a recent immigrant caused him to not be chosen as leader.  John Adams’ quote 
concerning the appointment of Washington makes this point clear: “Treat the General 
with all that confidence and affection, that politeness and respect, which is due one of the 
most important characters in the world.”  It was the character and style of Washington 
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that appealed to his contemporaries and aided in their decision to make him the tangible 
symbol of the United Colonies.150
However, Congress was also equally concerned with the attitude of the mass 
population.  Despite the patriot’s talk of liberty and freedom, the rights about which these 
men were speaking had limits and Congress sought to empower a leader who understood 
those limits.  John Randolph, attorney-general of Virginia, referred to these limits when 
he suggested that the government was being handed over to the “ignorant vulgar” 
because political candidates began protesting laws that forced non-slave holders to ride 
patrol at night and watch for runaway slaves.  Joseph Galloway warned against 
“companies of armed, but undisciplined men, headed by men unprincipled.”  Although 
Congress, like most colonists, feared a standing army, it realized that in order to defend 
America against Great Britain a well trained regular army was needed.151  The attitudes 
between Congress and the people it theoretically represented created a need for someone 
who could be trusted to lead the army and serve as an inspiration to others but at the same 
time maintain a specific order.  
George Washington, like many of his contemporaries, was highly conscious of his 
character and how his character was perceived by his contemporaries.  Many biographers 
of Washington have noted his close attention to correcting, at a young age, the aspects of 
himself that he viewed as defects.  Washington also spent a considerable amount of time 
crafting his public persona by copying and memorizing lines from the Rules and Decent 
Behavior in Company and Conversation.  Gordon Wood noted that almost all of the 
“Founding Fathers” adhered to these rules of civility, but none of them more devoutly 
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than Washington.  Taken in this light, it is easier to understand why the character of 
Washington, often described as aloof and cold, was appealing to many of his 
contemporaries.  Unlike other contemporaries such as Thomas Jefferson and John 
Adams, Washington did not receive a formal education, something he was always self-
conscious about, but compensated for by observing and listening to educated persons.  
His behavior in public was often described as shy, but many of his contemporaries, 
including French officers and officials, recognized Washington’s “gift of silence.”152  
One of the most important aspects of Washington’s character that was appealing 
to his contemporaries was the level of modesty he displayed both before and after the 
Revolutionary War.  After he was appointed Commander-in-Chief, Washington answered 
by promising only to do his best:
Tho' I am truly sensible of the high Honour done me, in this Appointment, yet I 
feel great distress, from a consciousness that my abilities and military 
experience may not be equal to the extensive and important Trust: However, as 
the Congress desire it, I will enter upon the momentous duty, and exert every 
power I possess in their service, and for support of the glorious cause. I beg they 
will accept my most cordial thanks for this distinguished testimony of their 
approbation.
Washington then stated:
But, lest some unlucky event should happen, unfavorable to my reputation, I beg 
it may be remembered, by every Gentleman in the room, that I, this day, declare 
with the utmost sincerity, I do not think myself equal to the Command I am 
honored with.153
Washington ended his acceptance speech by announcing he would not accept any money 
for his service, which punctuated his already modest approach of assuming command of 
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the army.  However, it is clear that Washington was concerned with his reputation and 
wanted to publicly make a statement to cover his character in case something dreadful 
occurred.  After the war, Washington remained modest as evidenced by the writings of 
Jean-Pierre Brissot, who met with Washington at Mount Vernon five years after the war.  
Brissot wrote: “His modesty is astonishing to a Frenchman; he speaks of the American 
war, and of his victories, as of things in which he had no direction.”154
Before Washington assumed command of the army, his status as a symbol for the 
American cause had already caused a sensation throughout many of the colonies.  
Because the appointment of Washington reflected a shift in a large portion of colonial 
America’s society, many people came to see Washington as he departed Philadelphia en-
route to take command of the army around Boston.  The scene was repeated as he 
traveled through New York and again as he neared Boston.  Colonial Americans were 
looking for a symbol to represent their cause and Washington was easily identifiable.  
Benjamin Rush explained that “you would distinguish him to be a General and a Soldier, 
from among ten thousand people.”  Rush went even further by stating, “There is not a 
king in Europe but would look like a valet de chambre by his side.”155
Despite the assessments of men such as Rush, the reality Washington faced when 
he formally took charge of the army around Boston was shockingly dissimilar.  
Washington may have looked the part, but his army was something all together different.  
The militia that initially responded to the conflict was a variety of all types, and 
collectively represented a unique brand of resistance.  At first Washington approached 
the situation with a high level of optimism stating that it was wrong to expect that “troops 
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formed under such circumstances should at once possess the order, regularity, and 
discipline of veterans.”  Despite his initial positive outlook, Washington soon grew weary 
of the army’s situation, as well as the character of the troops he commanded.156
Washington wrote his cousin Lund Washington on August 20, 1775, and explained many 
of the problems he faced.  He could not understand why many Americans were reluctant 
to join the fight after the initial flood of interest.  However, Washington’s criticisms 
struck a much more profound chord when he wrote:
The People of this government have obtained a Character which they by no 
means deserved; their officers generally speaking are the most indifferent kind 
of People I ever saw…  I dare say the Men would fight very well (if properly 
Officered) although they are an exceeding dirty and nasty people.
Washington went as far to say that if the troops had been properly commanded, the 
British would have suffered much more damage at the Battle of Bunker Hill.157  After the 
initial hoopla concerning the creation of the Continental Army, the harsh reality of 
conducting the war began to set in on Washington, and often he responded with 
despondent prose.
One example of the opposition Washington faced when building the army of his 
choice came from his home state of Virginia where even before the conflict at Lexington 
some colonists had expressed concerns about being forced to fight.  Ray Raphael noted 
that individuals who expressed these concerns were not “unpatriotic,” but rather 
possessed concerns about the terms of enlistment and the army’s chain of command.  
Many of these individuals rejected the notion of being treated like a subordinate as well 
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as other standard military traditions, like elaborate uniforms.  The group became known 
as the Virginia “Shirtmen” as a result of the dress they adopted: a shirt and a belt with a 
tomahawk or knife.  These individuals resented the notion of having to adopt formal 
strategies because time was not on their side.  They did not have slaves to do their work 
while they were off fighting in the war, which caused them to put the basic need of 
providing for their family first.  As a result, revolutionary governments were forced to 
rely on the services of men who had no other choices in life and tended to be vagabonds.  
The Virginia “Shirtmen” were not an oddity; many other colonies experienced the same 
reaction to a long-term war.  Before the British pulled out of Boston it was apparent to 
Washington that he needed what he did not have, a professional army.158
Despite the problems Washington faced in creating a professional army, the first 
year of the war passed with relatively little conflict.  The Continental Army forced the 
British out of Boston by outmatching their guns, thanks in large part to the efforts of 
Henry Knox, and support for Washington and the war was still alive.  A few months into 
the war a song was written entitled “New Song,” which included Washington’s name in 
the opening line: “Since WE your brave sons, insens’d, our swords have goaded on, / 
Huzza, huzza, huzza, huzza for WAR and WASHINGTON.”159  Other songs and poems 
were published in newspapers and sung in homes and taverns across the colonies, 
including a poem by Philip Freneau, who has been labeled by many as the poet of 
American Revolution.  The opening lines of Franeau’s 1775 poem “American Liberty, a 
Poem” contributed to the already growing development of Washington as a mythic 
figure:
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See Washington New Albion’s freedom owns,
And moves to war with half Virginia’s sons,
Bold in the fight, whose actions might have aw’d
A Roman Hero, or a Grecian God.160
One of the most important facts to keep in mind when considering how 
Washington was perceived by the public is that he did not enjoy complete popular 
support.  William Bryan noted that, “It must be remembered that another third favored 
the crown and that the remaining third were by comparison indifferent.”161  Although 
Bryan’s figures have been disputed by most modern historians, his figures do help to 
illuminate the differing opinions of colonial Americans.   Just as rebels had songs 
venerating their cause and their leaders, so too did those who remained loyal to the 
crown.  One of the most popular Loyalists songs was entitled “Burrowing Yankees” in 
reference to the immense amount of digging done by the Continental Army outside of 
Boston, and displayed the resolve of those loyal to the crown:
And the time will soon come when your whole rebel race
Will be drove from the lands, nor dare show your face:
Here’s health to great George [III], may he fully determine,
To root from the earth all such insolent vermin.
“Burrowing Yankees” was published at least four different times and first appeared in the 
Halifax Journal, which indicates the important role that colonial newspapers played 
during the war.162
In his study of the development of American journalism, Eric Burns noted that 
“the Revolutionary War was not an easy one to cover.”  Many newspapers failed to 
survive the war for a variety of reasons.  The war caused a shortage of supplies for items 
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such as paper and ink that halted the production of many papers, plus many of the 
individuals who labored to create newspapers were actively engaged in the combat.  
Subscriptions to newspapers also thinned for the same reason and a lack of extra money 
to spend on the newspapers that were available.  Providing a newspaper or journal did 
survive, it was very difficult to attain and disseminate information concerning the war in 
the midst of the British army.  However, at the beginning of the conflict many papers 
resonated with the rally for war.  The New York Journal remarked, “The kind intension of 
our good mother-our tender, indulgent mother, are at last revealed to all the world.”  
Other pro-Revolution papers reported the opening conflicts with patriotic zeal.  Likewise, 
Tory publications such as the New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury reported the war 
with an equally obvious bias.163
Although many newspapers did fail during the Revolutionary War, there is 
evidence that the overall number of newspapers continued to rise.  In his statistical study 
of colonial newspapers Thomas Tanselle discovered that in the three decades before war 
the number of newspapers increased.  John C. Miller noted that “the American 
Revolution was one of the first great popular movements in which the newspapers played 
a vital role.”  One important statistic shows that between 1763 and 1783, 530 political 
satires were published, of these about 70% could be seen in a newspaper.  The pamphlet 
was also a useful tool that colonists used to disseminate information concerning the rift 
between themselves and Great Britain.164  However, newspapers and pamphlets were 
most effective in rallying support before the conflict turned bloody, once the war began 
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colonists no longer sought to justify their reasons for resistance, a fact that was made 
concrete with the adoption of the Declaration of Independence.
The shift in the priorities of American journalism manifested itself through more 
thorough analysis of events and decisions made by war leaders.  Journalists who wanted 
to cover the war had to rely in large part on the letters sent to and from Congress by 
leaders such as Washington.  Although it was not the norm, some journalists did travel to 
camp and interview various officers, including Washington, but often journalists were 
relegated to speaking with subordinates.  Although Washington was not completely 
comfortable with being interviewed, he did once suggest to Congress that it assign a 
traveling group of journalists so that information concerning the war could be written 
with some authenticity.  After Washington was forced to retreat from Manhattan to White 
Plains, were he was defeated again, some newspapers started to question his leadership.  
The questioning of Washington’s leadership marked the beginning of the love/hate 
relationship that the press had with him, and likewise he had with the press.  After Gates’ 
victory at Saratoga at least one newspaper, The New Hampshire Gazette, found a new 
hero that it celebrated with a poem.165
Washington was also celebrated and berated in the theatre, though on a much 
smaller scale than in song or in lyrical verse.  Of the plays that were written, only a few 
were actually performed during the Revolutionary War; most plays concerning 
Washington were written after the war or after his death.  However, one of the first plays 
written concerning Washington and the war was titled The Fall of British Tyranny, 
attributed to Joseph Leacock in 1776.  The play expressed the feelings of many colonists 
at the time by placing the blame for the crisis on members of the British Parliament.  
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Washington’s character appeared in the latter portion of the play, joined by Charles Lee 
and Israel Putnam.  The three commanders collectively lamented the death of Richard 
Montgomery and then pledged their life to the cause of liberty.  Another play that briefly 
discussed Washington was written by Mrs. Mercy Otis Warren, a farce entitled The 
Motley Assembly, which toyed with the notion of Washington as “godlike.”  
In response to The Fall of British Tyranny, New York publisher Jemmy 
Revington published an anonymously written farce entitled The Battle of Brooklyn.  The 
Battle of Brooklyn is significant because the author personally attacked the character of 
many Revolutionary War leaders, particularly Washington.  Washington was presented as 
a tyrant in his own right, who unjustly assumed command of an immoral rebellion.  
Washington’s military competence is also mocked and scoffed at by the author.  The play 
also emphasized the social position of Washington as opposed to the composition of the 
army he commanded.  Washington was portrayed as being paranoid that the army would 
rise and overthrow his power because of the large social gap that existed between the 
wealthy Virginia planter and the majority of the poor, dirty men who comprised the army.  
The author also went as far to suggest that Washington was paying one of his 
chambermaids for sexual favors.  Overall, the play was a “scurrilous attack on the private 
lives of the Patriots.”166  The Battle of Brooklyn is significant because some of the 
accusations that the author expressed were founded in reality and may have been 
influential in shifting the attitudes of many who were undecided to the British side. 
The issue of slavery was a hot topic during the Revolutionary War for a variety of 
reasons.  Gordon Wood accurately noted that slavery was well ingrained in the minds of 
eighteenth century individuals living in colonial America.  Individuals such as 
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Washington justified slavery because it had been in existence for thousands of years and 
was only the lowest rung on the great social hierarchy that was by no means equal.  
About one fifth of colonial Americans were slaves and Washington’s home state 
contained almost half of the total number of slaves in colonial America.  The Revolution 
changed the way individuals in America perceived slavery.  Although many individuals 
continued to practice and condone slavery during and after the Revolution, they were 
acutely aware of the fundamental contradiction between their rhetoric of freedom and the 
institution of slavery.  Washington condoned slavery when he took charge of the army 
and was shocked to find many African-Americans under his command.   Initially he 
rejected the notion that African-Americans could be in the army, but later changed his 
mind when necessity demanded.  Washington went as far as offering freedom to any 
slave who fought for the Continental Army in 1779 and allowing Rhode Island to create 
an African-American regiment.  It is justifiable to say that Washington led a racially 
integrated army because around 5,000 African-Americans fought for the American 
Revolution.167  However, to the Loyalists’ eye the contradiction was evident and was 
used as propaganda to justify the immorality of many Patriots.
Although most individuals who remained loyal to the English Crown did not think 
too highly of Washington, at least one Loyalist from Boston proved to be an exception.  
Before the New York Campaign of 1776 was set into motion by General William Howe, 
the Loyalist Bostonian’s letter was published in Lloyd’s Evening Post and British 
Chronicle.  The author stated that many Americans had been “deluded by Patriots, 
Fishers in troubled waters, and hot-headed Republican Preachers,” and that they were 
“actually poor and wretched…more enslaved by their Congress than the subjects of 
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Morocco.”  However, instead of criticizing the character of Washington the author 
applauded it and sought to justify Washington by explaining he had been thoughtful as a 
member of the First Continental Congress and capable of restraint as leader of the army.  
The author noted Washington’s “generous spirit was for allowing the friends of 
Government the liberty of thinking for themselves.”168  The author represented a unique 
perspective during the revolutionary crisis because their viewpoint did not applaud the 
American Congress or the English Parliament, but it nonetheless respected the character 
of Washington as an able, just leader.  However, after the signing of the Declaration of 
Independence and the New York Campaign, the character of the war changed.
Despite the losses suffered by the Continental Army in the New York Campaign 
of 1776, Washington still retained support from most Patriots.  Many revolutionaries, 
including Henry Laurens, thought that Washington should be allowed some room to 
make mistakes: “The General very well knows we are, and will continue to make suitable 
allowances for all defects seeming or real.”  The extent of what Laurens referred to as 
“suitable allowances” was pushed by the failure of the army to protect the American 
capital of Philadelphia from being captured by the British.  It was failures such as these, 
coupled with the fall of New York and the success of American General Horatio Gates at 
Saratoga that led a small group inside the army and Congress to plot to overthrow 
Washington’s leadership.  The conspiracy was dubbed the Conway Cabal in relation to 
the size of the anti-Washington clique and was overwhelming denied by other members 
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of Congress once the plot was revealed.  Many who learned about the plot responded 
with the cry: “Washington or no army!”169     
The Conway Cabal clearly displayed the loyalty of most of the revolutionaries in 
regards to Washington’s brand of leadership.  However, even before the Conway Cabal 
and the fall of Philadelphia, John Adams expressed a growing concern about the 
idolization of Washington.  Adams registered his complaint during a session of Congress 
on February 19, 1777, weeks after the success of the Continental Army at Trenton and 
Princeton.  Congress was debating whether it or Washington should choose a number of 
major-generals to serve in the war; Adams was against Washington choosing, which is 
not surprising since Congress was the source of Washington’s authority.  But Adams took 
his argument one step further by stating:
I have been distressed to see some of our members disposed to idolize an image 
which their own hands have molten.  I speak here of the superstitious veneration 
which is paid to General Washington.  Although I honor him for his good 
qualities, yet in this house I feel myself his superior.170
Adam’s quote clearly demonstrated the amount of hero worship associated with 
Washington not only throughout the colonies but inside the governing body of the newly 
declared America.  Adams was not against the leadership of Washington, but he did have 
a problem with individuals losing sight of who was really in charge of the revolution, and 
in his mind Congress was in charge.
Adam’s insight into the singular fascination many Americans had concerning 
Washington is further illuminated when taken within the context of Elias Boudinot’s 
comments to Alexander Hamilton in July 1778.  Boudinot was serving as commissary-
general of prisoners when he wrote: “Every lip dwells on his praise, for even his 
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pretended friends (for none dare to acknowledge themselves his enemies) are obliged to 
croak it forth.”  Boudinot actually recorded an interview with Washington later in July 
after he wrote Hamilton.  Boudinot had tried in vain to obtain “hard money” from 
Congress in order to clothe prisoners of war, but was met with denial.  His interview with 
Washington is revealing because it sheds light on the multi-faceted nature of 
Washington’s post.  Washington told Boudinot, “He was Genl. Quarter Master and 
Commissary.  Everything fell on him and he was unequal to the task.”  Boudinot 
informed Washington had he could borrow money from his own credit, to which 
Washington replied if Congress did not reimburse him he would go in on half the losses 
with Boudinot from his own personal account.171  
Both Adams and Boudinot were justified in making the statements that they did.  
Adams’ concern over the growing “cult” of Washington was well founded, especially 
with the memory of Cromwell in his mind, but Boudinot’s statements were also founded 
in reality.  One could justifiably say Boudinot’s statements represent a more realistic 
approach to the problems that Washington faced because Boudinot was actually taking 
part in the fighting and experienced first-hand the many difficulties Washington faced in 
leading the army.  Historian Bruce Chadwick noted the many different positions that 
Washington was forced to assume when he became Commander-in-Chief.  When 
Boudinot conducted his interview with Washington the army was experiencing hard 
times.  The army’s encampment at Valley Forge clearly displayed the weakness of 
Congress in organizing and supplying its soldiers, plus the hard-times at Valley Forge 
caused a rift between soldiers and civilians.  Chadwick explained that most civilians 
during this time thought the army needed no help because Congress had raised the army 
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and it and the states collected taxes that were to be used for the maintenance of the 
army.172  
Washington soon realized that he only had two options: Congress and the army.  
He also realized the faults inherent with the type of system used to manage the 
Revolutionary War.  In order to properly supply the army Washington became convinced 
that a “separate, civilian administrative branch of government to operate all federal 
agencies, separate from Congress but with Congressional overseers” was needed.  
Washington was convinced his solution could properly remedy the situation because his 
solution was founded upon his own personal experience of being forced to assume 
unofficial leadership of the civilian state.173  One of Washington’s closest contacts and 
friends throughout the Revolutionary War was the Governor of New Jersey, William 
Livingston.  Livingston and Washington’s relationship is symbolic of the multi-faceted 
role Washington played during the war as leader of the military and civilian state.  
Livingston knew the troubles that Washington faced as Commander-in-Chief and 
responded with vengeance to criticism directed at Washington.  Livingston wrote a letter 
to Charles Lee after the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse in which he stated that his 
support for Washington was not, “from a blind attachment to men of high rank, nor from 
any self-interested motive whatsoever, but from a full conviction of his great personal 
merit and public importance.”174
Despite the willingness of men such as Livingston and Laurens to publicly 
denounce anyone who suggested Washington’s leadership was not adequate, Washington 
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certainly had his detractors.  But one of the most vocal writers who bashed the character 
of Washington and the revolutionary movement in general proved, in the end, to only 
lend support for those who characterized Washington as brilliant.  Jemmy Rivington 
began denouncing the revolutionary movement in its early phases and once Washington 
was named leader of the newly created army, Rivington summed up Washington as 
“underskilled and overrated.”  Not long afterwards Rivington was almost killed by a mob 
of angry colonists in mid-1775 before escaping, but his types used for printing were 
melted into bullets.  Rivington considered leaving America for good, but opted to ask 
Congress for a pardon concerning any wrong doings on his behalf, which Congress 
granted.  However, Rivington took time before reentering America and first traveled to 
England where he was given, by Parliament, a new press and the title of the Crown’s 
printer in New York.  Rivington returned and continued to blast Washington throughout 
the war.
Rivington was hated by patriots throughout America. William Livingston scolded 
Gouverneur Morris for his previous support of Rivington’s paper and stated: “If 
Rivington is taken, I must have one of his ears; Governor Clinton is entitled to the other, 
and George Washington, if he pleases, may take the head.”  Although Livingston was 
close to Washington, he did not know the complete story.  From the surface it is 
reasonable that Livingston would make such a statement, after all he was steadfastly loyal 
to Washington.  But what he did not know was that Rivington had been all the while 
employed by Washington to gather information concerning the movements and plans of 
the Royal British Navy.  Thanks to the efforts of Rivington many soldiers were saved 
because on at least one occasion his information helped the Continental Army break the 
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British military’s code.175  Washington did not reveal the true identity of Rivington until 
after the war was over when he stopped by his office in New York to “embrace and thank 
him” for willingly becoming the “most hated editor in America.”176  Washington’s 
relationship with Rivington is important not only because it provided information 
concerning the enemy but also because it reveals the willingness of Washington to 
endorse the slaughter of his character for the overall good of the army.  Perhaps 
Washington was confident that enough people would continue to support him and the 
army no matter what individuals such as Rivington said.  Ample evidence existed that 
would prove such an assessment by Washington to be reasonable.
In addition to the many poems and songs that were published during the initial 
phase of the Revolutionary War, more were produced as the war continued that tended to 
focus on Washington as a majestic leader of the people.  One of the most well-known 
lyricists of the Revolutionary War was Mitchell Sewall who wrote the immensely popular 
ballad “War and Washington” in addition to an Epilogue for Joseph Addison’s Cato that 
compared the Roman hero of the play to Washington.  The African-American poetess 
Phillis Wheatley sent Washington a copy of her verse in his honor, to which Washington 
responded with much gratitude.  Francis Hopkinson also contributed with his brand of 
satirical work, once proclaiming: “Had he lived in the days of idolatry he had been 
worshipped as a God.”  But one of the most unique and ultimately meaningful tributes 
came via Charles H. Wharton, who was a citizen of England and a Roman Catholic:
Great without pomp, without ambition brave,
Proud not to conquer fellow man, but save;
Friend to the wretched, foe to none but those
Who plan their greatness on their brethren’s woes;
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Awed by no titles, faithless to no trust,
Free without faction, obstinately just.177
Despite the amount of bad press Washington received from the Rivington and other 
“true” Tories, the support he received from a wide variety of individuals more than 
compensated for the words of his detractors.
Unlike Charles Wharton, most Americans who were in favor of the war were 
Protestants, but they nonetheless espoused the same enthusiasm that Wharton displayed 
in his tribute to Washington.  From the beginning of the war many Americans viewed 
their struggle with Great Britain within the Biblical context of the Children of Israel and 
their struggle with Egypt.  Therefore, Washington was compared and often referred to as 
Moses.  From the beginning of hostilities many religious individuals drew comparisons 
based on the hopelessness of the situation: Moses facing the mighty Egypt, Washington 
against the giant empire of Great Britain.  It was said after the end of the conflict: “Moses 
led the Israelites through the Red Sea; has not Washington conducted the Americans 
thro’ seas of blood?”  A good deal of the literature comparing Washington to Moses was 
published directly after the death of Washington.  They drew comparisons between the 
similar nature of both men’s role as civilian and military leader as well as their decision 
to leave positions of authority with sound farewell addresses.178  The comparison of 
Washington as a religious figure is important to understanding his overall appeal because 
many citizens throughout the entirety of the war viewed the war in a religious context.  
That many Americans during the Revolutionary War viewed the conflict in terms 
of providence is not surprising because throughout time people from all parts of the globe 
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have done so.  What is remarkable is the situation that Washington ultimately found 
himself in, as the American Moses.  In a sense, many people viewed the conflict with 
Great Britain as preordained, and in that respect the role Washington was to play had 
already been created for him.  This type of thinking led individuals to one logical 
conclusion: the Americans would emerge from the conflict victorious.  As a result, many 
people reported to the army with such a notion of the conflict in mind.  Washington was 
in attendance to hear the Bostonian preacher Rev. Leonard quote from Exodus: “And He 
locked their chariot wheels, and caused them to drive heavily; and Egyptians said, ‘let us 
flee from the face of Israel, for the Lord fighteth for them against the Egyptians.’”  
Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin, and John Adams contributed to the comparison by 
choosing a depiction of Pharaoh caught in the collapsing Red Sea as the emblem for the 
initial design of United States Seal.  The motto stated: “Rebellion to Tyrants is obedience 
to God.”  Comparisons such as Moses crossing the Red Sea indicate that the development 
of Washington as some “god-like” creature did not solely rest on the talents of the man.  
Instead, the references to Washington as Moses indicated “the new nation’s need to 
articulate and concretize the fervent beliefs and emotions of its citizens.”179
Washington did not have a problem with being compared to Moses because he 
needed all the support he could get and religion certainly aided in motivating people to 
fight for the cause.  However, despite the Biblical comparisons Washington was not a 
strictly religious man.  He was a child of the Enlightenment, but he did not subscribe 
wholeheartedly, as many of the revolutionary generation did, to Deist beliefs, nor was he 
an atheist.  Rather, Washington realized the popular appeal of religion, but he never 
seriously subscribed to any religion.  Years after the war in a letter to Lafayette, 
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Washington wrote: “Being no bigot myself to any mode of worship, I am disposed to 
indulge the professors of Christianity in the church, that road to Heaven, which to them 
shall seem the most direct plainest easiest and least liable to exception.”180  Washington 
was more comfortable referring to God as the “All-powerful guide, and great disposer of 
human Events.”181  Throughout the war Washington often spoke in terms of providence, 
but his rhetoric was founded in reason and hard work.    
One of the most interesting and ultimately telling ways to interpret the character 
and style of Washington as he was perceived by others during his life is through French 
contacts.  Many Frenchmen joined the Revolutionary War to fight for the American cause 
and a great deal of money was also spent by French officials as well as the government.  
Although foreign officers, especially the French, were often loathed by American soldiers 
and officers, many of them became close with Washington and joined his “military 
family.”  One of Washington’s closest comrades during the Revolutionary War was the 
young Marquis de Lafayette who, after the tense situation created by the Conway Cabal, 
wrote Washington a letter that helps to explain what Washington came to mean to some 
individuals engaged in the war.  Lafayette wrote: 
Take away for an instant that modest diffidence of yourself (which, pardon my 
freedom, my dear general, is Sometimes too Great, and I wish you could know 
as well as myself, what difference there is Between you and any other man 
Upon the continent), You Shall See very plainly that if you were lost for 
America, there is nobody who could keep the army and the Revolution for six 
months.
Lafayette explained that the letter was “very useless and even very importune,” but he 
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had to take the opportunity to explain to Washington his feelings because, “You, my dear 
general, who have been indulgent enough as to permit me to look on you as upon a 
friend, could know the confession of my sentiment in a matter which I consider as a very 
important one.”182
Lafayette may have thought his letter was useless, but given the character of 
Washington it is highly likely that the letter helped to raise the spirits of the Commander-
in-Chief.  Lafayette’s letter is revealing because it suggests as the Revolution grew older 
the dependency upon Washington grew as well.  Other French sources such as Jean 
Baptiste Gouvion shed light on how Washington was perceived during the war.  Gouvion 
served seven years in the Revolutionary War, and after the Treaty of Paris he wrote 
Washington a farewell letter.  Gouvion, like many revolutionaries, referred to 
Washington as “your Excellency” and was thankful for his time spent fighting for 
American independence.  Gouvion stated that it was joyful to know that the services he 
had provided during the war had satisfied Washington and “I shall always take pride in 
remembering that I was an American officer.”  Gouvion ended the letter by expressing 
his belief that Washington should be heralded as a hero: “May your Excellency 
experience from his country a gratitude so well deserved, but which can never be equal to 
the unparalleled toils, labors, and cares you have sustained to save it.”183  
Despite the loving words written by individuals such as Lafayette and Gouvion, 
perhaps the greatest tribute paid to Washington by the French came via “the Mother of 
Armand.”  The Mother of Armand had a son who served under Washington and she 
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sought to thank Washington for the manner in which he treated her son.  Perhaps her 
letter was a bit too enthusiastic in its praise of Washington, but it bears repeating:
Will the hero of our age, the man of all ages, the object of the admiration of all 
the nations & particularly of France, the theme of true enthusiasm, will the great 
Washington allow a French woman…to join with a feeble voice in that tribute of 
praise which every one pays to that Great Man- Some compare him to Cezar, 
other to trajan…they take the talents & virtues of modern characters, in order to 
form out of them a Great Whole, here their art fails, forgive this familiar 
Language, it is that which we address the Gods.184
By the time the Revolutionary War was over, despite the pleas of individuals such as 
John Adams, many people throughout the world perceived Washington as a supernatural 
being, whose talents and extraordinary character was the primary force behind the 
success of the American Revolution.  Washington’s actions after the Treaty of Paris only 
helped to reaffirm the already present belief among many that he was a “great man.” 
Unlike other historical figures such as Oliver Cromwell, after the conclusion of 
the Revolutionary War George Washington retired and returned to private life.  His 
decision to retire to private life was based on his ever present ability to read the attitude 
of those around him.  Washington knew that the American Revolutionary movement 
called for a leader whose “eloquence or example could make them want to do what they 
knew they ought to do.”  Hence the statement: “Washington did not create the republic.  
The Republic created him” is accurate.  Although Washington may have not created the 
republic, he was present at nearly every stage of its development.  “Washington’s 
disinterested service, in war and peace…was not flawless; but it was rounded and 
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balanced that, for people with a less classical ideal of rule, it looks soporifically 
perfect.”185  
Washington’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army was 
not born out of his singular passion for power, but of a collective thrust of resistance that 
chose him as its physical and symbolic leader and example.  Some of Washington’s 
contemporaries compared his style of leadership with that of a circle because it was the 
most perfect of all forms.  In other words, Washington was talented, but not too extreme.  
Washington’s actions were not designed for short-term glory, but long-term success;
therefore, his actions often came across as dull.  Barry Schwartz summarized the 
atmosphere that gave rise to Washington: “In the New American Republic- a society that 
valued character over genius, conservatism over dedication to change, diffidence over 
ambition…we find a different version of human greatness.”186  Revolutionaries were not 
looking for another great military leader such as Frederick the Great but a leader who 
embodied their core beliefs and served as a shining example of republic virtue.
Gordon Wood labeled George Washington America’s only classical hero and 
noted that only Benjamin Franklin matched his international fame, but Washington was 
“much more of a traditional hero…admired as a classical hero in his own lifetime.”  
Washington was keenly aware of his newfound position and acted accordingly 
throughout the rest of his life.  But Washington was “one of Plutarch’s men…he 
belonged to the predemocratric and pre-egalitarian world of the eighteenth century, to a 
world very different from the one that followed.”  Therefore, it is understandable why his 
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character seems so far removed from the modern America he helped to create.  In the 
end, Wood determined that it was Washington’s character that distinguished him from 
other men.  Washington’s style and manner was just about all the revolutionary 
generation looked for in its leader.  Washington appeared virtuous but more importantly 
self-taught and capable of restraint, in other words he “seemed to possess a self-cultivated 
nobility.”187
One of the unique ways to interpret what Washington meant to his contemporaries 
as well as the generations of Americans who followed is by viewing Washington in terms 
of a “living tribal totem.”  Primitive peoples used objects such as animals and plants to 
express their belief in “the moral authority of society.”  These objects in their own right 
are not sacred, but because “they symbolize something greater than themselves” they 
assume a hallowed position.  As human beings became more civilized, these objects 
changed from animals to human beings.  The objects had always contained a “sacred” 
meaning, thus when people became symbolic leaders “the line between religion and 
politics blurred.”  Washington was a product of his “tribe,” and ultimately he was chosen 
and venerated because “he symbolized the bond between his society’s political and 
religious sentiments.”188
Throughout the entirety of the Revolutionary War the character of Washington 
was subject to criticism that spanned the entire spectrum of sentiments.  From the 
beginning there were groups of dedicated individuals who either hated or applauded him, 
as well as many who remained somewhat indifferent.  However, as the Revolution 
continued the importance of Washington to the cause increased in the minds of most 
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dedicated Patriots, especially those closest to him such as Lafayette, until he became an 
indispensable part and ultimately the absolute symbol of the fight for American 
independence. Washington’s status as a symbol for America continued to grow after the 
Revolution and especially after his death.  His contemporaries knew that when he passed 
an era had come to an end, but individuals throughout the modern world still find 
inspiration in the character of Washington.
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